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Roger Pearson
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The Theater Missile Threat and Allied Defense

Howard Bloomberg
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There presently is an important debate on the requirements of missile defenses that could be deployed by the beginning of the next century. The rationale for the U.S. missile defense program since the end of the Cold War has shifted from an emphasis on national defense to one of overseas theater defense. (Although, even now, there are voices demanding that national defense should be given the higher priority.) The Gulf War of 1991-2 highlighted missile defense in general, and theater defense in particular, when Iraq launched scores of Al Hussein ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads toward Saudi Arabia and Israel. The only available defense was the Patriot interceptor developed for air defense and rushed into service as a defender against ballistic missiles.

With a shrinking defense budget much scrutiny is being directed toward the high costs associated with missile defense. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is the largest program now sponsored by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). TMD is meant primarily to protect U.S. forces abroad and its allies against missile attack by Third World rogue states. The core of the TMD program is the planned acquisition of terminal defenses, which are to be positioned within or close to the areas being protected from missile attack. These core systems have an estimated cost of $ 20 B.[1] This cost may be approaching a limit to the amount of money the U.S. is willing to spend on missile defense.

Beyond the core terminal defense programs BMDO sponsors three far term TMD programs that have not been accorded acquisition status, mainly because of their significant costs. Two of these programs involve systems that are positioned away from the area under protection and closer to the attacking missile launch sites.

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[1] Brad Hathaway, U.S. GAO, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 1994.

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The third far term program involves a system for advanced cruise missile defense in addition to terminal ballistic missile defense.

Acquisition of the far term programs is unlikely unless the U.S. receives funding from other countries. Inclusion of other countries in the U.S. missile defense programs is not a new idea. Several writers have advocated the internationalization of missile defenses. As a raison d'être for the NATO Partnership, Richardson[2] proposed international cooperation on missile defense within the aegis of the Partnership for Peace and under the NATO structure. Fox and Orman[3] recommended multinational cooperation on missile defense systems, so that objections based on the binational U.S. - Soviet 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty could be overcome. Also BMDO has developed the structure to incorporate foreign participation into the missile defense program.

In this paper we argue that the European Alliance partners should be included in cost-sharing joint ventures in the acquisition of the three far term TMD programs. There are several reasons why the European partners and the U.S. should support these joint ventures: 1) the threat of the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by missile attack is becoming more likely; 2) the European partners of the Alliance are considerably more vulnerable to this increasing threat than is the U.S.; 3) the far term BMDO TMD programs are well suited to meet European vulnerabilities; 4) the U.S. can not be expected to bear the costs of missile defense systems required by the allies.

We organize this paper by describing the emerging threat of weapons of mass destruction deliverable by missile systems and then by showing how credible missile threat scenarios can affect Europe. After reviewing the ongoing U.S. theater missile defense programs, we identify Third World countries that may threaten the Western Alliance with missile attack. We point out that potential adversaries already have chemical warheads for delivery by their missiles. We then describe how theater ballistic missiles have the potential to maximize destruction by dispersing biological and chemical weapons

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[2] Robert C. Richardson III, "Saving the NATO Partnership," *The Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring, 1994, pp. 13-20.

[3] E. Fox and S. Orman, "Countering the Missile Threat," *The Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Winter, 1994, pp. 387-397

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over a large area. We further explain why biological and chemical warheads suitable for delivery by cruise missiles may be an even nearer term threat.

We then discuss a hypothetical threat scenario involving missiles launched from Algeria to several targets in Southern Europe and simultaneously launched against postulated French expeditionary forces in North Africa. We show how the BMDO far term systems can be an appropriate response to this threat scenario. Finally, we suggest that these defenses are important enough to France and the Western Alliance that the development and acquisition of the far term TMD systems in joint cost-sharing programs should be pursued.

U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Programs

The U.S. through BMDO is pursuing a two-track program in robust theater missile defense (TMD).[4] There is a core of terminal defense programs that are on acquisition track and where production is expected to begin in the next 3-6 years. In addition, there are three far term programs for which decisions on possible acquisition are expected near the turn of the century. All these programs generally are described in terms of the performance of the interceptors that kill attacking missiles. However, the associated sensors needed to follow the trajectories of the missiles are critical to the effectiveness of any missile defense system. We here summarize the interceptor programs and then discuss generally the role of the tracking sensors.

Interceptors

The U.S. is now committed to acquire the ground-based hit-to-kill Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors to provide defense overseas. THAAD will protect a relatively large area from missile attack and will intercept the missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes. In addition, the Patriot Advanced Capability Level - 3 (PAC-3) defense system, that has significantly greater capability than the Patriot system (PAC-2) employed in the Gulf War, will provide lower tier defense. The PAC-3 interceptor is the Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) that achieves lower altitude intercepts in the

[4] Lt. Gen. Malcolm R. O'Neill, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 11, 1994.

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endo-atmosphere. Finally, the Navy will acquire shipborne lower tier interceptors that purportedly have missile defense capability similar to that provided by the PAC-3 system. The system will be based on enhancements to the current AEGIS/Standard Missile air defense program.

Three other systems have been put on hold because of fund limitations. One, the mobile Corpsam (Corps Surface-to-Air Missile) program, will develop interceptors to destroy cruise missiles as well as ballistic missiles. Another program, called the Navy Upper Tier, will provide wide area defense by shipborne interceptors that destroy their missile targets at exo-atmospheric altitudes. The third program is Boost Phase Intercept (BPI). Here either an airborne laser or an interceptor released from an airborne platform destroys a missile during its boost phase. The BPI platforms are located relatively close to the hostile missile launch sites.

Tracking Sensors

It is extremely difficult and thus very expensive to produce an interceptor that reliably can strike a ballistic missile moving with a speed well in excess of 1 km/s (2000 nautical miles per hour). While such a feat – hitting a bullet with a bullet – obviously requires high interceptor performance, the role of sensors in guiding the path of the interceptor is just as important. Sensors must provide detailed information on the missile trajectory to allow the interceptor to be released against the missile as soon as possible.

Generally, the tracking sensors are located near the position of the interceptor platform. For terminal defense this means that the collocated sensor is far from the enemy missile launch site so that the missile is not tracked until late in its trajectory. Consequently, interceptor release is delayed, and this reduces the size of the area under protection. On the other hand, boost phase interceptors and their associated sensors are forward-positioned close to missile launch sites, so that they protect a very large area against missile impact. Similarly, ships in the Navy Upper Tier can be positioned toward the enemy launch sites and thus achieve wider area protection.

Of course, tracking sensors need not be located near the interceptor platforms, and they can be positioned to track missiles soon after launch. For example, sensors can be placed on several satellites orbiting in space. These sensors can look down on the

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boosting missiles. The use of space-based sensors to provide detailed track information to missile defense platforms and interceptors is controversial,[5] however, and we do not explore this option further in this paper.

Finally, sensors tracking the air-breathing cruise missiles, which fly at speeds less than 1 km/s at altitudes under 30 km, encounter another set of problems. It may be difficult for sensors to locate and track cruise missiles with low signatures or to discriminate them from other slow aircraft. Moreover, because it flies at low altitude, adequate track may not be possible until the cruise missile is close to its target, and this means that timely release of an interceptor may be difficult.

Theater Missile Proliferation

We here consider theater ballistic missiles to be those missiles with ranges between 300 and 3500 km. The lower limit of 300 km was chosen because it is the minimum range covered by the original 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). On the other hand, the maximum range of 3500 km was chosen because of its importance in talks between the U.S. and Russia on possible modifications to the 1972/4 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. These talks are underway to establish a demarcation between theater and strategic ballistic missiles. It tentatively has been agreed that ballistic missiles with velocities under 5 km/s will be classified as theater missiles for the purposes of the treaty,[5] and 3500 km is the nominal range of ballistic missiles with this speed.

Cruise missiles are a theater threat. We use the 300 km minimum range criterion in the 1987 MTCR to distinguish cruise missiles from shorter range air-breathing missiles. Although the U.S. and Russia have cruise missiles in-service with ranges as high as 3000 km, the maximum range for Third World cruise missiles is about 600 km.

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[5] Richard A. Falkenrath, "Theater Missile Defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," *Survival*, Vol. 36 No. 4, Winter 1994-95, pp. 140-160.

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While many nations today have missiles,[6] there is evidence that a core of Third World countries support each other in the development and acquisition of these delivery systems. As an indication of this level of activity we have identified Third World countries allegedly involved in joint missile development programs. Joint programs in this area heighten suspicion that the conditions of the Missile Technology Control Regime are being violated. Thus, countries involved in joint activity may be considered the most aggressive potential threats. In the spring of 1994 Lennox[7] listed five joint missile development programs. Iran participated in every one of these programs! It had two with China, two with North Korea, and one with Libya. Lennox reports that all joint programs involved theater ballistic missiles with ranges between 950 and 1700 km. This information is provided in Table 1, which lists the types of ballistic missile, their ranges, and the countries participating in the joint development activity.

It was also reported that North Korea is developing on its own the Taepo-Dong 1 and 2 theater ballistic missiles with ranges of 2000 and 3500 km, respectively.

Lennox does not list Iraq or Syria as being involved in joint missile development ventures. Still, it is prudent to include these states on a list of high risk countries that could threaten the Western Alliance with missile attack. The case against Iraq is well established. Syria has several in-service missile types that it shares with the four joint developers. Not only does Syria have the ubiquitous SS-1 'Scud B'(300 km range) along with many other countries including Iran, Libya, and North Korea, but it also has the 'Scud B' variant in-service along with just Iran and North Korea. It also shares the 'Scud C' variant (550 km) with Iran, Libya, and North Korea. It allegedly is the only outside country that possesses the Chinese built CSS-6 'DF-15/M-9' (600 km).

Table 7 lists the in-service theater ballistic missile types and

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[6] See, for example, Humphry Crum Ewing, Robin Ranger, and David Bosdet, "Ballistic Missiles, The Approaching Threat," *Bailrigg Memorandum 9*, CDISS, Lancaster University, U.K., 1994; Robert G. Nagler, *Ballistic Missile Proliferation, An Emerging Threat*, System Planning Corporation, Arlington, VA, 1992.

[7] Duncan Lennox, "Ballistic missiles hit new heights," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 30 April 1994, pp. 24-28.

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Table 1

Ballistic Missiles in Joint Development

Ballistic Missile Type	Range (km)	Developing countries
Al Fatah	950	Iran, Libya
Labour-1 (Nodong 1)	1000	Iran, North Korea
M 18 (Tondar-68)	1000	China, Iran
Labour-2 (Nodong 2)	1500	Iran, North Korea
DF-25	1700	China, Iran

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Table 2
In-service Theater Ballistic Missiles in High Risk Countries
(Ranges 300-3500 km)

Ballistic Missile Type	Range (km)	User Countries
SS-1 'Scud B'	300	Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria
'Scud B' variants	300	Iran, North Africa, Syria
CSS-7 (DF-11/M-1)	300	China, Iran
'Scud C' variant	550	Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria
CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9)	600	China, Syria
Al Hussein	650	Iraq
CSS-N-3 (JL-1)*	1700	China
CSS-5 (DF-21)	1800	China
CSS-2 (DF-3)	2800	China

* Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

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ranges for the six high risk states: China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria as cited by Lennox.

There are at present considerably fewer cruise missiles than ballistic missiles in Third World inventories. According to Lennox[8] Syria alone of the 6 high risk countries has an in-service cruise missile: the SS-N-3 'Shaddock/Sepal' (450 km). He reports that Iran is developing the CSSC-2 'Silkworm' variant cruise missile with a range of 450 km and that Iraq is developing the 500 km range Ababil cruise missile. Little information is available on Chinese programs, although it is reported that they are developing a 600 km range cruise missile. Lennox predicts that the inventories of cruise missiles in the Third World will increase sharply over the next few years.

In summary, China and North Korea are major centers of advanced missile weaponry while Iran is becoming an important center for advanced missiles both as a recipient and as a potential manufacturer. Libya and Syria are particularly active in the acquisition of advanced missile systems. Iraq has shown its potential for weapon manufacture and may resume these activities vigorously once the U.N. trade embargo is relaxed.

The six high risk states discussed here could well take advantage of opportunities to proliferate missiles or related technologies to other countries. If, for example, Algeria moves toward the camp of the extremists, it could become a major recipient of available, advanced missiles from one or more of the high risk countries.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

In order to justify the acquisition of high cost missile defense systems, it is important to evaluate the destructiveness of warheads delivered by enemy missiles. It is not at all clear that the lesson of the Iraqi *conventional* missile attacks during the Gulf War is the need for active missile defenses. Instead, it could be argued that better civil defense could best mitigate the psychological stresses caused by highly visible missiles that nonetheless inflict relatively minor damage. It also can be argued that during the Gulf War the deployment of attack aircraft to seek out and destroy the ballistic missile infrastructure in

[8] Duncan Lennox . "Cruise: a missile for the '90s." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 7 May 1994, pp. 19-20.

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Iraq was at least as effective as were the Patriot missile defense interceptor batteries. U.S. surveillance of potential missile launch areas inhibited Iraq from launching a larger share of its missile inventory.

Once missiles can deliver weapons of mass destruction, however, then the imperative for effective missile defense becomes nearly unassailable. For this reason it is important to evaluate the possibility that missiles from the high risk countries and their allies can be used as delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. The immense build-up of nuclear tipped missiles during the Cold War attests to the practicality of missiles for delivery of nuclear warheads. However, it is yet to be established that any high risk country save China now has nuclear weapons. China, however, appears as reluctant as the other acknowledged nuclear powers to provide this technology to other countries. Unfortunately, though, there is strong evidence that several high risk countries possess chemical weapons and plan to deliver them by missiles.

Biological and chemical agents are much more accessible to the nations of the world than are nuclear weapons. There are several reasons[9] for this. First, modern technologies including genetic engineering have enhanced the ability to manufacture new biological or chemical agents or enhance the effects of the old agents. Second, it is much more difficult to determine that chemical and especially biological work is weapons related. Third, the manufacturing of biological and chemical agents is now done on a large industrial scale rather than on a much smaller research laboratory scale.

Inspection of Iraq after the Gulf War confirmed the existence of chemical weapons in that country. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) found in Iraq thousands of chemical warheads suitable for artillery rounds. Apparently, the Iraqis did not deploy biological or chemical weapons on their Al Hussein (600 km) missiles launched during the Gulf War. According to reports,[9] however, they did produce about 50 chemical weapon warheads for these missiles. These were found to be sufficiently flawed that their operational effectiveness was doubted. Nevertheless their very

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[9] Terry J. Gander, ed., *Jane's NBC Protection Equipment 1994-5, 7th Edition*, Jane's Information Group, Alexander, VA 22314.

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presence reveals an ambition to develop chemical weapons deliverable by relatively long range theater missiles.

Bermudez[10] reports that North Korea at the end of the 1980's had produced chemical warheads for its 'Scud C' variant (550 km). He also reports that Syria in the mid-1980's embarked on program to develop chemical warfare agents and chemical warheads for its 'Scud B' (300 km) and possibly its short range (70 km) SS-21 missile. Eisenstadt[11] reports that Syria now has scores of chemical warheads filled with the nerve agent sarin for its 'Scud-C' variant as well as for its 'Scud B.'

Missile Delivery Systems for Biological and Chemical Weapons

An aggressor state delivering biological and chemical weapons by missiles obviously would want to maximize casualties. If the agent is laid down over too small an area, the lethal zone may be too small. On the other hand, if the laydown is over too large an area, then the concentration of the agent might be too low to be lethal. Alternatively, laydown over a large area could produce relatively small lethal "pockets" widely spaced from each other. It would be relatively easy for civil defense to evacuate people from the small lethal pockets into non-affected areas. To ensure effectiveness of a biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction the adversary would want to create the largest contiguous lethal area possible.

Theater ballistic missiles carrying submunition warheads have the potential to inflict huge casualties in the delivery of biological or chemical weapons. The submunitions could be released outside the atmosphere, where control of their dispersion is relatively simple. The submunitions then could be sufficiently widely dispersed when the they enter the atmosphere and release their agents. The combination of extensive coverage and the required degree of overlap would provide the most devastating attack.

It is difficult to know what kind of chemical warheads are being used by Syria and North Korea on their theater ballistic missiles. The warheads may be based on the unitary chemical warhead the Soviet

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[10] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Warfare Arsenal," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1993, pp. 225-228.

11 Michael Eisenstadt, "Syria's Strategic Weapons," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4, April 1993, pp. 168-173.

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Union designed for its 'Scud B.'[12] On the other hand, it has been reported[7] that Russia exhibited an SS-21 upgraded 'Scarab B' (120 km) and has offered it for export along with a submunition warhead option. As noted Syria already has the SS-21 'Scarab A' for possible use as a chemical weapon delivery system. Syrian possession of the upgrade could be a significant step in its acquisition of chemical or biological submunition warheads.

It is still not clear, however, whether or not Third World countries are now able to deploy biological or chemical weapons effectively from theater ballistic missiles. It may be difficult to disperse agents efficiently from warheads traveling at the high speeds of theater ballistic missiles: 1 1/2 km/s for 300 km range missiles up to 5 km/s for 3500 km ranges missiles. Moreover, the trajectories of theater ballistic missiles pass rapidly through widely varying layers of the atmosphere, and this could further complicate effective dispersal of biological or chemical agents.

However, munitions capable of deploying chemical or bio-logical agents from slower moving aircraft or artillery shells are widespread throughout the world. These weapons could be deployed from cruise missiles, which travel at the relatively slow speeds of aircraft. The agents, for example, could be released as an aerosol line source over an entire city length Their subsequent diffusion over the city area could produce a large number of casualties.[13]

In conclusion, there is little doubt that Third World ballistic missiles have the potential for being devastatingly effective carriers not only of nuclear weapons but of biological and chemical warheads as well. However, chemical weapons warheads delivered by slower moving artillery shells and aircraft are presently better developed and more numerous than are chemical (and biological) warheads for the faster ballistic missiles. This means that the slower cruise missiles are serious contenders in the medium term to be effective delivery systems for biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

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[12] Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991, pp. 5-42.

[13] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559, Washington, DC, U.S. Printing Office, August 1993, pp. 52-54.

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Missile Threat Scenarios

Western countries are vulnerable to missile attack against either their expeditionary forces or their homelands. The ranges of missiles being developed by high risk states could easily reach important targets in Western Europe. An extremist takeover in Algeria could lead to its becoming a high risk threat. Missiles from Algeria with ranges of only 1000 km can reach important cities in Spain, France, and Italy. A missile launch could be threatened against any one of a large number of European targets located over a wide angle threat "fan." Simultaneous defense of all potential targets may demand an excessive number of terminal missile defense batteries.

Within the Western Alliance the U.K., France, and the U.S. have large expeditionary forces. Of these countries the French must be most concerned because not only their expeditionary force but also their homeland could be vulnerable to simultaneous missile attack.

The nightmare scenario for the French is that Algeria becomes radical and acquires weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. Algeria is the most populous country in the wide stretch of North African states, the Maghreb, west of Libya. Its instability likely would spill over into Tunisia and Morocco, the other countries in the region. France would be tempted to use its expeditionary forces at least to protect these countries if not to seek control over Algeria itself. Such action by the French could trigger simultaneous Algerian missile attacks against the expeditionary force and the French homeland.

As indicated in its White Paper[14] France appears to be aware that use of its expeditionary forces abroad may place its homeland in danger of retaliation by missile delivered weapons of mass destruction. Since the homelands of its southern European allies are at risk as well, France faces the problem that the use of its expeditionary forces may be subject to their vetoes unless they too are secure from missile attack.

Missile Defense Responses

The multiplicity of potential large city targets in Europe from missiles launched from Algeria poses an important missile defense

[14] Livre Blanc sur la Défense, released 23 February 1994, pp. 62, 85.

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problem. Can all these homeland sites be protected by nearby terminal defense systems, or, if the number of these systems is excessively large and expensive, is forward-positioning of missile defenses toward the missile launch sites a viable option? A forward-positioned system of interceptor platforms and sensors can achieve intercepts early in the missile trajectory and increase the area protected from missile impact. Thus, such defense systems may be more cost-effective than are terminal defense systems with their tracking sensors distant from the missile launch sites.

There are several advantages in destroying ballistic missiles early in their trajectories. First, there is less chance that any debris will affect the intended missile target area. Second, the intercept may occur before the scheduled release of submunitions. Once submunitions are released the number of targets for the interceptor rises many fold and mission success becomes highly impractical. Early intercept could forestall the arming of nuclear warheads and thus reduce the possibility of warhead detonation upon interceptor impact. Third, an early intercept attempt complements terminal defense in adding an extra tier of protection. If an early intercept attempt fails, there is sufficient time remaining for the terminal defense to commit yet another interceptor. Moreover, the sensors connected with the boost phase intercept may be able to provide the terminal defenses with early track information, so that the terminal defense sensors can identify the missile more quickly.

If expeditionary forces (and the associated host nation infrastructure) and Western homelands are simultaneously vulnerable to missile attack, it may be effective to integrate missile defense into the aircraft attack force. The corresponding missile defense would be brought as far forward as possible to achieve intercept early in the missile trajectory, when possible during the ballistic missile powered flight stage or boost phase. Boost phase intercept is particularly effective when the hostile launch site areas have been identified and the number of suspected missile aim points is large. An aircraft platform sufficiently close to the launch site to intercept a missile in boost phase will be successful no matter where the intended missile target site is located. Thus boost phase intercept aborts missile attack against expeditionary forces or against any number of targets in the allied homelands.

Besides the destruction of ascending ballistic missiles close to

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their launch sites, the BPI sensor elements can help locate the Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs) used to launch the missiles. TEL interdiction by attack aircraft is an important complementary mission to missile defense. TELs are high value targets, and their destruction limits the capability of the enemy to continue missile launches.

There are, however, some obvious problems with BPI. It is successful only when the airborne platforms are close enough to the launch sites when missiles are launched. This is difficult since the positions of mobile launchers are not known with accuracy and the number of combat air patrols (CAPs) necessary to monitor all potential launch sites might be prohibitively large. Furthermore, BPI requires a high measure of air superiority if not outright air control close to hostile territory. Components of the BPI system could also be vulnerable to surface to air missile attack.

For North Africa-Southern Europe missile threat scenarios shipborne interceptors stationed in the Mediterranean would also be forward-positioned but generally not so close to enemy launch sites as boost phase interceptors. They could protect a wide angle threat trajectory "fan" and still destroy enemy missiles early in their trajectories (but generally not before booster burn-out).

Finally, the expected proliferation of cruise missiles, with their ability to deliver biological and chemical if not nuclear warheads in the medium term, demands effective defenses. The PAC-3 ERINT is designed to intercept cruise missiles as well as ballistic missiles and would certainly will be a valuable asset against this threat. However, Corpsam is the BMDO far term program for a highly mobile system against cruise missiles as well as ballistic missiles. The Corpsam concept is especially well suited to the protection of maneuvering expeditionary forces.

U.S. Missile Defense Policy

In a tight budget environment the U.S. must decide on how to help its allies defend their homelands and their own expeditionary forces against missile attack. France may be the most vulnerable ally, since it may have to provide missile defense protection for its homeland and those of its European neighbors as well as to its expeditionary forces. In our view the threat to France and other countries of the Western Alliance is sufficiently serious to justify the

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U.S. to seek European cooperation with the U.S. in the development and acquisition of the three far term BMDO programs: Boost Phase Intercept (BPI), Navy Upper Tier, and Corpsam.

Fortunately, cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies in defense against cruise missiles is now beginning. The U.S. is joining France, Germany, and Italy in the future acquisition of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) that will provide advanced cruise missile defense. MEADS is a mobile defense system and is intended to combine elements of Corpsam with European replacement of the Hawk air defense missile.[15] This program could be the model for further cooperation in ballistic missile defense.

Besides missile defense the U.S. should continue to support and strengthen treaties preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We believe that the development of submunitions that can be widely dispersed from ballistic missiles should be monitored carefully, and that proliferation of such warheads should be prohibited. Such warheads containing biological or chemical agents would cover a large area in a city and, consequently, could kill thousands of civilians in a terror attack. A prohibition on proliferation of such warheads would reduce dramatically the potential destructiveness of biological and chemical weapons. The need for missile defenses remains, however, since rogue states will find ways to undermine arms control treaties.

Conclusions

The threat of longer range theater ballistic missiles capable delivering weapons of mass destruction is highly plausible. Logic dictates that an aggressor using missiles traceable to the country of launch will attempt to maximize its destructive capability. Because of its relatively long transit times and the largely exo-atmospheric trajectory, a theater missile will be able to disperse biological or chemical bomblets over a wide area to maximize its effect. A single missile in a terror attack on a large city can cause tens of thousands of casualties. European cities are at risk, and the U.S. can use this argument to initiate cost sharing in the missile defense program.

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[15] Barbara Opall, "U.S., France, Germany Mold Trinational Anti-Missile Effort," *Defense News*, Vol. 9, No. 49, December 12-18, 1994, p. 41.

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Missile defenses must be deployed to provide simultaneous protection for expeditionary forces and the European homelands. Furthermore, the nearer term threat of cruise missiles carrying biological or chemical warheads (if not nuclear weapons) requires increased attention to cruise missile defense.

The far term advanced TMD system concepts sponsored by BMDO are well suited to provide enhanced missile defense of our European allies. They should be encouraged to work with the U.S. in cost-sharing programs to develop and acquire these systems.

Howard Bloomberg has worked for several years on U.S. ballistic missile defense programs.

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Tibet: Endurance of the National Idea

Stephen R. Bowers
and
Eva M. Neterowicz

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Changes in U.S. Missile Policy

Eugene Fox and Stanley Orman
General Technology Systems Inc., Rockville MD

The new Republican-controlled U. S. Congress is rushing forward legislation on a wide range of topics as it seeks to implement the main features of its "Contract With America", which it announced prior to the November 1994 elections. Amongst the promises made was one to improve the defense posture, which has prompted a plethora of articles advocating a requirement for a National Missile Defense (NMD). This equates to a return to the position in 1991 when President Bush redirected the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program from its previous focus on deterrence of a massive Soviet ballistic missile (BM) attack, to one of protection of the U.S., its forward deployed forces and its allies and friends from limited BM attacks. Congress enacted the 1991 Missile Defense Act as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1992 and 1993. In a 1992 revision to the Act, NMD was relegated to a back-up program and the status and funding of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) was enhanced. Since then, TMD has been the only program in an acquisition phase.

At first sight, the change in control of Congress to a party which traditionally has been more supportive of defense should be beneficial to BMDO. Budget documents prepared in the Pentagon for presentation to Congress showed a planned expenditure of close to $22 billion for missile defense through 2001. This would represent a $5 billion increase over the 1993 bottom-up-review, which covered the funding period from 1995-1999. Pentagon sources have attributed the planned BMDO increases to anticipation of heightened Congressional support for missile defense activities.

The United States has been pursuing two separate objectives in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) for several years. One has been to deploy an effective defense without abandoning or contravening the ABM Treaty. The second objective has been to enhance stability and security by encouraging allies, and erstwhile opponents, to collaborate in BMD activities. While the U.S. concentrated on global defense,

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they had little success in encouraging allied participation; Israel being the only nation that was prepared to invest significant resources in BMD. Since the change in emphasis from global defense to TMD, others have shown more interest. A preliminary agreement has recently been initialled for the joint development of a Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) between U.S., Germany, France, and Italy. Japan and the U.K. have separately allocated resources to studies of TMD. This is all illustrative of a greater willingness to acknowledge the risks associated with the proliferation of missile and warhead technology, subjects which most governments had shied away from facing since the fall of the Former Soviet Union (FSU).

Allied Reservations

There were many varied reasons why most allied nations did not embrace the concept of BMD. Some were relevant to particular countries, while others could be categorized as problems which were perceived to be too politically difficult to tackle at this time. Typical amongst them were:

A. A lack of funding for new defense programs, exacerbated by declining defense budgets as countries sought the promised peace dividend after the fall of the FSU.
B. A reluctance to acknowledge a growing missile threat to either their homeland or their vital interests.
C. An almost unshakable belief that deterrence, coupled with non-proliferation controls, has proved to be a successful policy that requires no modification.
D. A presumption that the ABM Treaty had been a vital component in avoiding hostilities between the U.S. and the FSU, and must therefore be preserved.
E. A conviction that no defense can be sufficiently effective against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and therefore, the investment in BMD cannot be justified.
F. The U.S. has its own agenda in pursuing BMD.

Changes in U.S. Policy

The new policy emerging in Congress for a return to an NMD suffered a setback but is certainly not dead. This new program has been accompanied by renewed calls for reintroduction of technologies

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such as Brilliant-Pebbles and Space-Based Lasers. It was these very systems, not permissible under the existing ABM Treaty, which gave concern to many allies (and erstwhile opponents) in the past and led to the perception that the U.S. might be pursuing a different agenda. This should not be interpreted as an allied concern that the U.S. would wish to provide strategic protection for Continental U.S., but that the incorporation of space-based weaponry will inevitably give the appearance of a global capability to a single superpower.

The allies would not be alone in becoming alarmed at these developments. Recent reports indicate that the U.S. Administration itself is attempting to hurry through an agreement with the Russians that would preclude some of the concepts which were introduced to Senators and Congressman by a new group calling themselves Coalition to Defend America. As a result of these activities, it was reported in Aerospace Daily, January 25 1995, that President Clinton has received letters signed by 17 House Republicans (on January 4) and 22 Republican Senators (on January 17) advising him that the U.S.Russian talks are "seriously off-track," and could have the effect of "foreclosing a number of promising TMD options."

To put this complex situation into perspective, it has to be understood that TMD has progressed on the basis that an effective defense could be deployed without, in any way, contravening the ABM Treaty. Advocates of a strong defense have pointed out that longer range interceptors such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Naval Upper Tier would be even more effective if they were able to accept target information directly from space-based sensors by a technique known as cueing. This would maximize the protected area on the ground and enable the defense to attempt multiple interceptions. Such concepts led opponents of the plan to estimate the performance of the upper tier systems against intercontinental missiles.

A New Way Forward

As the Legislative and Administrative Branches of the U.S. Government spar over this very important area, there is a danger that interests and concerns of the allies will be overlooked. The most effective way of avoiding this possibility would be to find a way of sidestepping around the ABM Treaty and thus be able to proceed with the deployment of an efficient TMD devoid of restrictions.

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Ironically, the path to this solution has been proposed by President Yeltsin in early 1992, and has been repeated by several leading Russian officials. They claim that the ABM Treaty restricts national not international systems. It is presumed they made the statement to encourage Russian/U.S. cooperation in missile defense; an objective they are still seeking. There should be no need, however, to restrict such a cooperative venture to collaboration with the Russians, even if it was decided they could participate in a broader coalition with more traditional allies. The real importance of this proposal is that it appears to offer an elegant way out of the impasse without either side having to compromise its position.

It is not suggested that developing a truly international program for TMD will be an easy task, but the advantages such a route offers certainly justifies the effort. The possibilities appear to be limited solely by the imagination of those developing the activity. As a ground rule, it is suggested the interceptors remain totally under the control of individual nations and that the negotiations on what would constitute internationalization of the system should be restricted to the elements which provide the added performance capabilities. This could lead to internationalization of the control center for sensors and communications. This would guarantee that all participants receive pre-agreed levels of data at all times. It would ensure that collaborating nations were given a real role and could rely upon the system. Stability and security would be enhanced and the ABM Treaty would be unaffected. It would avoid the type of problem which has recently arisen between the U.S. and Russia. To proceed with the early THAAD flight trials, the U.S. has unilaterally decided to remove all cueing from these tests. This has resulted in some Russian disenchantment and perhaps has set down some ground rules for future negotiations.

The United States is the only nation that could take the lead to establish an international control center. No other country has a comparable technology base, such broad experience of working internationally, nor the world-wide interests which impact on American defense relationships. It is to be hoped that once America provides such a lead, others will recognize the importance and the generosity of the gesture and give their support and assistance in reaching the goal of a deployed, internationally controlled, effective TMD.

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Agricultural Development and Economic Growth

Maurice Schiff and Alberto Valdés
The World Bank

Industry, long considered the engine of growth, has been the darling of development. Agriculture, by contrast, was believed to be unresponsive to economic incentives and did not lend itself to technical change. Thus, policy-makers believed that promoting manufacturing industry at the expense of agriculture would sacrifice little in output – or so went the conventional wisdom in the 1960s and 1970s.

There was a logic to this conventional theory. Explicit agricultural taxes, such as export taxes, and implicit taxes, such as marketing boards paying farmers less than market prices, were easy to administer and extremely attractive in countries with a thin tax base. In addition, shifting scarce resources to industry was thought to be justified by agriculture's declining terms of trading, and by rising protection of agriculture in industrial countries. So policy-makers biased incentives against agriculture, directly through sectoral policies and indirectly through industrial protection and other policies.

But by the 1980s it was becoming apparent that agriculture was profoundly influenced by events external to the sector – industrial policy and exchange rates – which in turn affected investment, growth, and income in agriculture.

In order to better understand the effects on agriculture of price interventions, a recent World Bank study looked at 18 developing countries over 1960-85. The study came up with a number of findings that question the conventional wisdom regarding the impact of price interventions on agricultural prices, income transfers, growth, the budget, and income distribution. These findings provide a solid basis for prescribing agricultural price policies in developing countries.

The Impact of Government Policies on Agriculture

Governments influence agricultural prices both directly through agricultural sector policies, and indirectly through industrial protection and macroeconomic policies. Direct policies are defined

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as sectoral policies that affect the price level of the agricultural sector relative to the price level of the nonagricultural sector domestic terms of trade. Such policies include agricultural price controls, export taxes or quotas, and import subsidies or taxes. Indirect policies are defined as policies originating outside agriculture, such as industrial protection and macroeconomic policies. Indirect interventions can depress the prices of agricultural tradables relative to nontradables, through their impact on the real exchange rate, and relative to other tradables, due to industrial protection. These policies affect production incentives by making agriculture less attractive than other sectors of the economy.

What have been the effects of such direct and indirect interventions? The indirect effect of industrial protection and real exchange rate overvaluation was to depress agriculture's domestic terms of trade by about 22 percent on average for the 18 countries over the sample period – nearly 3 times the direct effect from sectoral pricing policies. The total effect (direct plus indirect) was to depress agricultural domestic terms of trade by over 30 percent. These would have been about 43 percent (30/70 = .43) higher in the absence of total interventions.

Macroeconomic policies caused the appreciation of the real exchange rate, raised the relative cost of nontradable inputs, and reduced the farmers' real purchasing power from the sale of export and import-competing commodities. Moreover, protection for domestic industry hurt agriculture by raising the domestic price of importable agricultural inputs above world prices.

But some direct measures benefited agricultural producers. Governments often subsidized the cost of farm credit and important agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer. However, such subsidized credit and fertilizer was often rationed and generally went to the larger, better connected farmers. Moreover, many developing countries, to increase their food self-sufficiency, protected domestic producers of import-competing food products through quantitative restrictions or tariffs on imported commodities. Also, most countries, responding to the instability of world markets, intervened to stabilize domestic producer prices relative to world prices.

On average for the 18 countries examined, direct interventions protected importables (18 percent) and taxed exportables (16 percent). The average reduction of the price of exportables relative

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to importables was over 30 percent. Direct interventions also led to a significant reduction in price variability: 32 percent on average for producer prices and 23 percent for consumer prices. On the other hand, the contribution of indirect interventions to price stability was negligible.

Since 1985, several countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have undertaken unilateral liberalization and stabilization programs resulting in relatively lower levels of industrial protection and real exchange rate overvaluation. Both the direct and indirect biases against agriculture have fallen in these countries.

The impact of Government intervention

In most industrial countries, the main objective of agricultural price policies is to maintain farm income and employment in the face of declining real world prices for cereals – with massive net income transfers to agriculture. In most developing countries, however, the primary objectives have been food self-sufficiency, domestic price stability, low food prices for urban consumers, and government revenue. This being said, the objectives of developing country agricultural policies have at times been quite contradictory. For instance, food self-sufficiency (implying high producer prices) and low consumer food prices are incompatible with generating government revenue. Fiscal constraints have forced an adjustment via lower producer prices.

On average, the net effect of direct and indirect interventions has been an enormous income transfer out of agriculture averaging 46 percent of agricultural gross domestic product a year during the period 1960-84. The average net transfer for the countries with a representative bias was 37 percent. Such enormous transfers must have severely depressed private investment in agriculture and agricultural growth. The big winners were government (net revenue gain), urban consumers (lower food prices), and industry (cheap raw materials).

Just as important is what the study did not find. Input subsidies did not compensate, or compensated very little, for the substantial income outflows resulting from interventions in output markets; and in most cases, public investment in agriculture (7 percent of agricultural GDP) did not compensate for the negative effects of price interventions. For the countries with the representative bias, the

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income transfer through input subsidies was never higher than 1.1 percent of agricultural GDP; and for all 18 countries, the average for 1960-84 was only 2 percent. Higher investment by government to compensate for taxing agriculture was found, to varying degrees, in only 5 of 15 cases, with only Egypt and Morocco showing compensation for all agricultural price policy or income variables tested.

Bias against Agriculture

To examine the impact of price policy on annual growth of real agricultural GDP, the study compared the average agricultural growth rate in the group of countries in which the bias was lower (minimal protection rates were higher) than the average, with the rate in the group in which the bias was higher (protection rates were lower) than the average. This test showed that the group with the lower bias (higher protection rate) showed a higher average growth rate.

For the groups with high and low direct bias, the difference in mean agricultural growth is a small 3.3 percent versus 4.3 percent; i.e., 1 percentage point, and statistically not significant. But for the two total bias groups, the difference is large – 2.7 percent versus 5.2 percent, i.e., 2.5 percentage points, or 90 percent – and significant. This provides strong evidence of an association between high total bias (mainly indirect) against agriculture and low rates of agricultural growth.

Further statistical tests revealed that the relationship between total bias and agricultural growth was significant: the lower the bias against agriculture, the higher the growth. Higher agricultural prices reduce labor migration from the sector, increase investment, encourage wider adoption of new techniques, and result in a higher growth rate.

Responsiveness to Price Changes

There has long been a presumption that the production of individual agricultural products responds significantly to higher prices – because of shifts between products – but that total agricultural production is unresponsive to incentives. This presumption is wrong. Experience shows that in the long run, the aggregate response can be sizable, though it may require some years to materialize. This highlights the importance of having stable and persistent policies.

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Direct and indirect bias against agriculture

	Period	Indirect bias (negative protection) (1)	Bias due to industrial protection (2)	Direct bias (3)	Total bias (4)
		(period average in percent)			
Extreme bias	1960–84	28.6	25.7	23.0	51.6
Côte d'Ivoire	1960–82	23.3	23.2	25.7	49.0
Ghana	1958–76	32.6	32.4	28.9	65.5
Zambia	1966–84	29.9	21.4	16.4	46.3
Representative bias	1960–86	24.2	32.8	12.0	36.4
Argentina	1960–84	21.3	39.5	17.8	39.1
Colombia	1960–83	25.2	37.8	4.8	30.0
Dominican Republic	1966–85	21.3	20.8	18.6	39.9
Egypt	1964–84	19.6	27.5	24.8	44.4
Morocco	1963–84	17.4	13.4	15.0	32.4
Pakistan	1960–86	33.1	44.9	6.4	39.5
Philippines	1960–86	23.3	33.0	4.1	27.4
Sri Lanka	1960–85	31.1	40.1	-9.0	40.1
Thailand	1962–84	15.0	13.9	25.1	40.1
Turkey	1961–83	37.1	57.4	-5.3	31.8
Mild bias	1960–83	15.7	22.9	0.2	15.8
Brazil	1969–83	18.4	21.4	-10.1	8.3
Chile	1960–83	20.4	37.4	1.2	21.6
Malaysia	1960–83	8.2	9.9	9.4	17.6
Protectors	1960–84	13.6	13.9	-24.0	-10.4
Korea, Republic of	1960–84	25.8	26.7	-39.0	-13.2
Portugal	1960–84	1.3	1.0	-9.0	-7.7
Sample average		22.5	27.9	7.9	30.3

Source: Maurice Schiff and Alberto Valdés, *The Plundering of Agriculture in Developing Countries*, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1992.

Note: Direct and indirect interventions have depressed agriculture's domestic terms of trade (AGTOT) below the prevailing level in the absence of these interventions. Direct interventions depressed AGTOT by 7.9 percent on average (column 3), indirect interventions depressed AGTOT by 22.5 percent on average (column 1), and total interventions (direct plus indirect) depressed AGTOT by 30.3 percent on average (column 4=columns 1 and 3). The indirect bias is a weighted average of the effect of the real exchange rate overvaluation and of the effect of industrial protection (shown in column 2).

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As noted above, price interventions in the 18 countries severely depressed agricultural prices during 1960-84. Without price interventions, agriculture's terms of trade would have been more than 4.0 percent higher. With such a large price impact from intervention, the effect of price reform on output is likely to be significant. How agricultural production responds to a price reform depends on how severely interventions have depressed prices, how extensive and credible the reform is, how responsive output is to a given price change, and what time period is considered.

Budget policies

The fiscal effects of specific agricultural price policies have received much attention and generated intense debate. But there have been few, if any, systematic attempts to quantify the net fiscal impact of price interventions. Consumer food subsidies have frequently been cited as a major drain on government budgets. But while they were a drain for some food-importing countries, this was not the case for most countries. Similarly, many countries have a tradition of subsidizing agricultural credit and inputs, conventionally interpreted as compensating producers for the heavy taxation of agricultural production. Yet such subsidies represent only a small part of government expenditure (averaging only about 2 percent over 1960-1985) while taxing agricultural exports yields substantial revenue to the government (averaging 10 percent of government expenditure). Indeed, the net effect of direct price interventions in agriculture was a net revenue gain (of output and input policies) to the government of nearly 7 percent over the period 1980-85, and as much as 17 percent during the 1960s.

The government's need for revenue to fund expanding development programs was probably the major impetus behind taxing agricultural exports, and it remains the major constraint to reform of direct interventions. On the other hand, in some countries the fiscal burden of input and food subsidies escalated so rapidly that it led to macroeconomic imbalances that could be corrected only through policy reform. Changes in agricultural policies in Portugal were dictated chiefly by budget pressures in the early 1980s, when fertilizer and feed subsidies were essentially eliminated. Attempts to reduce food subsidies in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Zambia also show the link between price policy and the budget.

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In most countries, the net budget effect of direct price interventions in agriculture was a gain in revenue, mainly through taxes on agricultural exports. And in three countries – Brazil, Ghana, and Sri Lanka – export tax revenues amounted to 20 percent or more of total government spending over the entire 1960-85 period. Over time, however, the net contribution of the price interventions for this group of countries fell substantially, from 18 percent of government spending in the 1960s to 5 percent in 1980-84. But in a few countries the revenue contribution remains important and undoubtedly constrains any policy reforms designed to reduce direct agricultural taxation. In those countries, sectoral reforms that would eliminate or reduce agricultural export taxes would need to be accompanied by economywide tax and fiscal reforms.

Urban versus Rural Benefits

Contrary to the widely held view that cheap food policies prevail in developing countries, direct price interventions penalized urban consumers in 6 of 14 countries for which data were available. In fact, most countries protected the production of agricultural importables, mostly food; and only a few of these countries also reduced consumer food prices through explicit food subsidies. Moreover, despite widespread direct interventions, the impact on the real income of urban households was generally small. In only 4 of the 14 countries (Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey) were the real income effects on both low- and middle-income households higher than 3 percent of their income.

However, adding the indirect price interventions, it was found that the total income gain for low-income urban consumers ranged from 0.2 percent to 5.3 percent of household incomes in 7 of 14 countries, and was 10 percent or more in three countries – Argentina, Egypt, and Turkey. The effect of the so-called cheap food policies took place mainly through real exchange rate over valuation rather than through direct price interventions. On the other hand, on the whole, direct price interventions have achieved the objective of stabilizing domestic agricultural prices. Hence, a motive underlying food price interventions may have been to prevent sudden large real-income losses in years of higher-than-average food prices rather than to raise the standard of living of the urban poor.

For the rural poor, the short-run income effects of price

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interventions were substantially higher and in the opposite direction from those for urban households in the same country. In most countries, rural households suffered real income losses. And direct interventions had considerably more impact on the real income of larger farms (or wealthier rural households), whether these were positive (as in Korea and Portugal) or negative (as Egypt and Turkey). Ghana was the exception, with small farmers gaining from direct price interventions because they produce more rice which was protected, and with larger farmers losing because they produced more coffee and coco, which were heavily taxed.

In the long term, the poor have lost disproportionately. Price interventions seem to hurt most of the poor in the long run (possibly because the full picture at the household level could not be measured). Taxing agriculture reduces rural demand for labor, so that rural employment and real wages fall. This leads to increased migration to the cities and increases competition for employment, and thus to a fall in income in the informal urban sector as well. Moreover, to the extent that the benefits from food subsidies were captured mainly by urban households, there has been a reduction in the real income of the rural poor and, indirectly, of the urban poor in the informal sector.

In the long run, indirect interventions affect income far more than direct intervention Thus, governments should not use direct (sectoral) price interventions in order to redistribute income, because the distributive benefit is small while the efficiency cost can be very large.

Policy reform

Since the mid-1980s there has been profound change in development strategies – with movements toward more open outward-oriented economies. Further, there has been a shift in thinking about the role of government in general. This has prompted reform of policies that affect agriculture in a number of developing countries.

Economic stabilization and trade liberalization have gradually emerged as the centerpiece in the reform of several developing countries' development strategy. This is most clearly the case in Latin America, but it is gradually being adopted in other regions as well. A consensus is emerging that preconditions necessary to restore

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economic growth include deep structural reforms that would open all economies and restore the private sector as the principal player. Thus, during the late 1980s in Latin America, for example, most countries embarked on a unilateral process of tariffication consisting of converting quantitative restrictions to tariffs, binding the tariffs under GATT, drastically reducing the coverage of nontariff barriers, removing export taxes, and reducing average import tariffs as well as their dispersion.

These reforms have led to a reduction in industrial protection and to a less distorted level of the exchange rate. Consequently, the indirect bias, the largest component of the total bias on agriculture, fell significantly in many countries. This was the case, for example, in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ghana, India, Mexico, Morocco, and Turkey, among others.

The direct bias has also been reduced in several countries. For example, in Argentina the export tax was eliminated. Export taxes were removed in Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and many other countries. However, there are still many countries, such as India, where trade reform has not yet reached the agricultural sector.

Hence, trade liberalization in the manufacturing sector and a reduction of export taxes on agricultural commodities have reversed the strong anti-export bias prevailing before the mid-1980s in a large number of countries. At the same time, however, there have been new developments that affect incentives for agriculture. One emerging concern has been the evolution of the real exchange rate (RER) in the same countries that have adopted the trade reforms. Largely as a result of increased private capital inflows following stabilization and trade liberalization, several Latin American countries (and this is also becoming an issue in India) have seen their real exchange rate appreciate. This RER phenomenon is already creating tension regarding trade liberalization programs for agriculture in some countries, such as Argentina, Colombia, and Chile. A key determinant of the success of trade liberalization is maintaining a competitive real exchange rate that encourages exports and gives some exchange rate protection to import-competing activities. Effective RER management could be most important for the sustainability of agricultural trade reform in the near future.

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Policy Recommendations

The findings of the study emphasize the importance of economywide factors on agricultural performance. Several policy recommendations emerge from these findings: If a country wants to prosper, it should not bias incentives against agriculture relative to other sectors or, what amounts to the same thing, it should not use policies to depress agriculture's domestic terms of trade. But to start this practice, the country must do more than dismantle the sectoral or direct intervention in agricultural prices – it must, in addition eliminate the indirect bias against agriculture (about three quarters of the total bias against agriculture in 1960-85), including removing industrial protection and getting the exchange rate into line with its long-run equilibrium value.

If a country wants to reap the large income gains possible from the reform of agriculture, it should stop the direct taxation of exports and the direct protection of imports (so as to put imports and exports on an equal footing) – and it should dismantle quotas, licenses, and state trading companies (which obscure the real winners and losers from subsidies or taxes), as well as those internal, agricultural marketing regulations that prevent a free flow of goods and services within the country.

To reap the full benefit of reforming agricultural prices and agricultural trade, it helps to improve finance, transport, and communication. If a country wants to stabilize prices at a relatively low cost, it should develop efficient hedging instruments, reform other agricultural policy interventions, and stop interest groups from subverting the price stabilization program in order to obtain a favorable change in the price level.

A number of reforming countries have seen their real exchange rate appreciate because of the capital inflows resulting from the reform. This has led to pressure by the agricultural lobbies for protection (e.g., in Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, and other countries). Consequently, in order to ensure that the reforms are not reversed, governments should carefully manage the short-term component of these large capital flows.

This theme has been developed more fully by the authors in the March 1995 issue of *Finance and Development,* under the title "The Plundering of Agriculture in Developing Countries."

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NSSM 200 and the World Population Explosion

Stephen D. Mumford
Center for Research on Population and Security

On March 30, 1995, Pope John Paul II made public his encyclical letter entitled *Evangelicum Vitae*, which assailed both abortion and contraception, in the strongest terms, charging that they are crimes which no human law can claim to legitimize and condemned even democratic decisions which did not conform to his concept of what constituted morality. This encyclical was the most sweeping attack on measures designed to save planet earth from the impact of the ongoing population explosion currently taking place in the poorest countries of the world. If followed it would effectively condemn the planet to deforestation, desertification and eventual ecological disaster. Sadly, the fact is that even prior to this latest ruling, the Vatican had already blocked one of the most conscientious efforts to slow down the slide toward world-wide disaster which has been increasingly evident to informed observers for several decades: this was the Vatican's success in blocking an American policy decision to combat this threat which dated from Richard Nixon's presidency, but was never put into effect.

In 1992, President Richard M. Nixon reasserted his long-held belief that overpopulation gravely threatens world peace and stability. In his book, *Seize the Moment* (Simon & Schuster, 1992), he ranks assistance in population growth control as the most important effort the United States can undertake to promote peace and stability – and, thus, protect U.S. security. He goes on to say:

> We must help break the link between spiraling population growth and poverty....Where they have been tried, family planning programs have largely worked....Many pro-life advocates ...contend that to condone abortion even implicitly is morally unconscionable. Their view is morally shortsighted....if we

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> provide funds for birth control...we will prevent the conception of millions of babies who would be doomed to the devastation of poverty in the underdeveloped world.

President Nixon did not have the grim lessons of Somalia and Rwanda when he wrote this book. However, he undoubtedly foresaw disasters of this kind more than 25 years ago. From his first days in the Oval Office, he understood the grave dangers of high rates of population growth – more than any other president. He responded appropriately when he perceived that the American people and their way of life were gravely threatened.

In 1974, the President requested the authoritative interagency study that came to be known as "NSSM 200" – National Security Study Memorandum 200. In order to effectively examine the content and fate of NSSM 200, we need to backtrack a bit to "the Rockefeller Commission." In 1969, seven months into his first term, in a rare move for a president, Nixon delivered his *Special Message to the Congress.*[1]

The message set forth a far-reaching commitment to limiting population growth. It set in motion a broad range of government activities, both domestic and international. It called for creation of the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, of which John D. Rockefeller 3rd was named Chairman. Other government activities initiated by the message included: (1) Increased research on birth control methods of all kinds and on the sociology of population growth; (2) Expanded programs to train more people to work professionally in the population and family planning fields, both in this country and abroad; (3) Expanded research on the effects of population growth on our environment and on the world's food supply; and (4) Increased domestic family planning assistance, to provide effective family planning services for all Americans who want them but cannot afford them.

The *Special Message* concluded as follows:

> One of the most serious challenges to human destiny in the last third of this century will be the growth of the population. Whether man's response to that challenge will be a cause for

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> pride or for despair in the year 2000 will depend very much on what we do today. If we now begin our work in an appropriate manner, and if we continue to devote a considerable amount of attention and energy to this problem, then mankind will be able to surmount this challenge as it has surmounted so many during the long march of civilization. When future generations evaluate the record of our time, one of the most important factors in their judgment will be the way in which we responded to population growth. Let us act in such a way that those who come after us...can do so with pride in the planet on which they live, with gratitude to those who lived on it in the past...

In an equally rare move, Congress voted to endorse this Special Message.

Design for a Population Policy

In March, 1970, Congress created The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, which completed its work in March 1972. The tasks assigned the Commission are described in the Preface of the Commission's final report:

> The Commission was asked to examine the probable extent of population growth and internal migration in the United States between now and the end of this century, to assess the impact that population change will have upon government services, our economy, and our resources and environment, and to make recommendations on how the nation can best cope with that impact.[2]

The 24 member Rockefeller Commission and its staff conducted an extensive inquiry, enlisting many of the nation's leading scientists in more than 100 research projects and hearing more than 100 witnesses in public hearings. The data collected and analyzed made it possible, for the first time, to formulate a comprehensive U.S. population policy.

After 2 years of intensive study, the Commission made more than 70 recommendations. They included: passage of a Population Education Act to help school systems establish well-planned

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population education programs; extension of widespread sex education, especially through the schools; passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA); extension of contraception for all, including minors, at government expense if need be; provision of abortion for all who want it, at government expense if necessary; vastly expanded research in many areas related to population growth control; and, elimination of all employment of illegal aliens.[2]

Killing the Commission Report

1972 was a presidential election year and President Nixon was facing a difficult re-election bid, so when a delegation of the Commission presented the final report to him on May 5, 1972, six months before election, he sharply condemned its most important recommendations.[3] Why was he attempting to distance himself from the report that he had anticipated so earnestly? In the words of a Commission member, Congressman James Scheuer (D.-NY):

> Our exuberance was short-lived. Then-president Richard Nixon promptly ignored our final report. The reasons were obvious – the fear of attacks from the far right and from the Roman Catholic Church because of our positions on family planning and abortion. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that this obstruction was but the first of many similar actions to come from high places.[4]

During the two years that followed, it became clear that there would be no further response to the Commission's recommendations. In May 1973, a group of pioneer population activists acknowledged this inaction and asked Ambassador Adolph Schmidt to speak with his friend, Commission Chairman John D. Rockefeller III. They met in June 1973, in New York City. Schmidt noted his own disappointment and that of his colleagues because no programs of any kind had been mounted as a result of the Commission's recommendations. What had gone wrong? Rockefeller responded: "The greatest difficulty has been the very active opposition by the Roman Catholic Church through its various agencies in the United States."[5]

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The Rockefeller Commission's recommendations were not shaped to fit the political realities of the day.[2] Rather, taken collectively, they constituted a detailed blueprint for a broad and sophisticated national population policy. None of the recommendations was ever implemented. To this day, unlike many countries, the U.S. has no population policy. It is shameful that the American people have been kept in the dark about this quite undemocratic and un-American intrusion by the Vatican. Surely, both Catholic and non-Catholic Americans would have strongly rejected such interference in the American democratic process had they been aware of it. Lay Catholic Americans desire the same number of children,[6] use contraceptives[7] and obtain abortions[8] in the same proportions as non-Catholics. They support school-based population and sex education[9] for their children, and advocate a halt to illegal immigration[10] into the U.S., in the same proportions as non-Catholic Americans. The quality of life for all Americans has been significantly diminished by this secret unconstitutional manipulation of American policy undertaken for the purposes of protecting papal interests.

Nixon's Next Bold Move

Despite the intense opposition of the Catholic hierarchy he encountered in the wake of the Rockefeller Commission, the President's assessment of the gravity of world overpopulation and his desire to deal with it remained unchanged. On April 24, 1974, in a forthright effort to contend with this crisis, Richard Nixon, in National Security Study Memorandum 200 (NSSM 200), directed that a comprehensive study be undertaken to determine the "Implications of World Population Growth for U.S. Security and Overseas Interests."[11] Its findings promised to be momentous indeed.

I can only speculate, but the President surely must have been aware that this new study would meet with the same intense Vatican opposition as the earlier one. However, perhaps he felt that a definitive study of the national and global security implications of overpopulation, revealing that the very security of the United States was seriously threatened, would generate public demand for action to curb population growth. Hopefully, it would

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overcome the blocks mounted secretly by the Vatican. Why else would he have undertaken this new study, given his painful experience after the Rockefeller Commission?

NSSM 200

In NSSM 200,[11] National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, acting for the President, directed the Secretaries of Defense and Agriculture, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Deputy Secretary of State and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), to jointly undertake "a study of the impact of world population growth on U.S. security and overseas interests." This work was completed on December 10, 1974 and circulated to the designated Secretaries and Agency heads for their review and comments.[12]

Meanwhile, on August 9, 1974, Gerald Ford had succeeded to the presidency. Revisions and refinements of the study continued until July, 1975. On November 26, 1975, the 227-page report and its recommendations were endorsed by President Ford in National Security Decision Memorandum 314. Wrote the new National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft:

> The President has reviewed the interagency response to NSSM 200 .... He believes that United States leadership is essential to combat population growth, to implement the World Population Plan of Action* and to advance United States security and overseas interests. The President endorses the policy recommendations contained in the Executive Summary of the NSSM 200 response..."[13]

President Ford, recognizing the gravity of the situation, asked the National Security Council (NSC) to take further action. Writes Scowcroft:

> The President, therefore, assigns to the Chairman, NSC

*The blueprint for a global population policy adopted by the nations attending the 1974 UN World Population Conference in Bucharest, Romania.

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Undersecretaries Committee, the responsibility to define and develop policy in the population field and to coordinate its implementation beyond the NSSM 200 response."[13]

NSSM 200 was intended to be and became a broad and definitive interagency study of the threat of overpopulation to U.S. security. NSSM 200 details how and why world population growth gravely threatens U.S. and global security. It also provides a blueprint for the U.S. response to this burgeoning problem, reflecting the deep concern of those who produced the report. Because of the bold nature of the recommended initiatives, the authors recommended that the report remain classified for 5 years in order to provide time to educate the American public as to the necessity of these initiatives. The NSSM 200 report actually remained classified for 14 years.

Both the findings and recommendations are as relevant in 1995 as they were in 1975, but too numerous to list here in their entirety. To select a few:

> There is a major risk of severe damage [from continued rapid population growth] to world economic, political, and ecological systems and, as these systems begin to fail, to our humanitarian values." [Executive Summary of the NSSM 200 Report, page 10]

The sense of near emergency is electric:

> ... World population growth is widely recognized within the Government as a current danger of the highest magnitude calling for urgent measures" [Page 194 of the NSSM 200 Report]. "... it is of the utmost urgency that governments now recognize the facts and implications of population growth, determine the ultimate population sizes that make sense for their countries and start vigorous programs at once to achieve their desired goals." [Page 15]

> ... population factors are indeed critical in, and often determinants of, violent conflict in developing areas. Segmental (religious, social, racial) differences, migration, rapid population

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growth, differential levels of knowledge and skills, rural/urban differences, population pressure and the spatial location of population in relation to resources – in this rough order of importance – all appear to be important contributions to conflict and violence ... Clearly, conflicts which are regarded in primarily political terms often have demographic roots. Recognition of these relationships appears crucial to any understanding or prevention of such hostilities" [Page 66].

Where population size is greater than available resources, or is expanding more rapidly than the available resources, there is a tendency toward internal disorders and violence and, sometimes, disruptive international policies or violence" [Page 69].

In developing countries, the burden of population factors, added to others, will weaken unstable governments, often only marginally effective in good times, and open the way to extremist regimes. [Page 84].

The World Population Plan of Action and the resolutions adopted by consensus of 137 nations at the August 1974 U.N. World Population Conference, though not ideal, provide an excellent framework for developing a worldwide system of population/family planning programs" [Executive Summary, page 19].

At the 1974 UN World Population Conference, only the Vatican opposed the Plan:

... the Conference adopted by acclamation (only the Holy See stating a general reservation) a complete World Population Plan of Action" [Page 87].

Suggested Goals and Plans

Our objective should be to assure that developing countries make family planning information, education and means available to all their peoples by 1980" [Page 130]. "...intense efforts are required to assure full availability by 1980 of birth control information and means to all fertile individuals, especially in

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rural areas. [Executive Summary, page 9].

> While specific goals in this area are difficult to state, our aim should be for the world to achieve a replacement level of fertility, (a two-child family on the average), by about the year 2000 ... Attainment of this goal will require greatly intensified population programs ... U.S. leadership is essential [Executive Summary, page 14].

It is now all too clear how crucial U.S. leadership was..and is. The U.S. withdrew from this role shortly after the election of President Carter, just one year after the initiation of public policy based on the NSSM 200 report. Government initiatives for curtailment of population growth have been going downhill ever since.

> ... After suitable preparation in the U.S., announce a U.S. goal to maintain our present national average fertility no higher than replacement level and attain stability by 2000" [Executive Summary, page 19]. "Only nominal attention is [currently] given to population education or sex education in schools ... [Page 158] ... Recommendation: That US agencies stress the importance of education of the next generation of parents, starting in elementary schools, toward a two-child family ideal. That AID stimulate specific efforts to develop means of educating children of elementary school age to the ideal of the two-child family ...[Page 159].

Despite the Helms Amendment passed by Congress, which clearly ruled out abortion assistance in U.S. foreign aid programs, there was a clear consensus that continued widespread use of abortion was vital to meeting/attaining the population stabilization objective:

> While the agencies participating in this study have no specific recommendations to propose on abortion, the following issues are believed important and should be considered in the context of a global population strategy ... Certain facts about abortion need to be appreciated:

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> – No country has reduced its population growth without resorting to abortion [Page 182].
> – Indeed, abortion, legal and illegal, now has become the most widespread fertility control method in use in the world today" [Page 183].
> – It would be unwise to restrict abortion research for the following reasons: 1) The persistent and ubiquitous nature of abortion. 2) Widespread lack of safe abortion techniques ..."[Page 185].

Two reports later published by this author offer considerable evidence to support the position that abortion is vital to U.S. and global security.[14,15]

An important goal in NSSM 200 dealt with leadership:

> These [family planning] programs will have only modest success until there is much stronger and wider acceptance of their real importance by leadership groups. Such acceptance and support will be essential to assure that the population information, education and service programs have vital moral backing, administrative capacity, technical skills and government financing [Page 195].

The report recommended spending whatever could reasonably be absorbed to achieve these goals:

> We recommend increases in the AID budget requests [for population and family planning programs] to the Congress on the order of $35-$50 million annually through FY 1980 (above the $137.5 million requested for FY 1975) ... However, the level of funds needed in the future could change significantly, depending on such factors as major breakthroughs in fertility control technologies and LDC receptivity to population assistance [Executive Summary, page 24].

Even after a country reduces fertility to the replacement level, the population continues to grow for another 70 years before stability is achieved. The study frankly dismissed the arguments

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that had been raised by the Vatican to counter efforts to reduce population growth. The position of the Roman Catholic Church on population growth centers on the need for economic development in Third World countries as a way to bring growth rates down – following the concept that as families ascend the economic ladder, they will choose to have fewer children. NSSM 200 takes an entirely different tack:

> We cannot wait for overall modernization and development to produce lower fertility rates naturally since this will undoubtedly take many decades in most developing countries ... [Executive Summary, page 7]. Clearly development per se is a powerful determinant of fertility. However, since it is unlikely that most LDCs will develop sufficiently during the next 25-30 years, it is crucial to identify those sectors that most directly and powerfully affect fertility [Page 137].
>
> There is also even less cause for optimism on the rapidity of socio-economic progress that would generate rapid fertility reduction in the poor LDCs, than on the feasibility of extending family planning services to those in their populations who may wish to take advantage of them. ... But we can be certain of the desirable direction of change and can state as a plausible objective the target of achieving replacement fertility rates by the year 2000 [Page 99].

These statements manifestly rule out *any* accommodation to the Vatican on the issue of population growth control.

NSSM 200 Implementation Quickly Stymied

The Vatican moved swiftly to block implementation of NSSM 200 recommendations already approved by President Ford, for reasons to be discussed later. Absent were the activities one would expect if a concerted effort were underway to implement NSSM 200. By the time the report was circulated among the relevant Department Secretaries and Agency Heads on December 10, 1974, the Church had recognized that NSSM 200 could spell the doom of a powerful Papacy.

Within months, the Vatican was able to stop progress toward

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any implementation of NSSM 200. During 1976, Catholic activists worked diligently to undermine all such population growth control initiatives. Dr. R.T. Ravenholt, who directed the global population program of the U.S. Agency for International Development in the Department of State from 1966 to 1979, tells the story. On March 4, 1991, he addressed the Washington State Chapter of Zero Population Growth (ZPG) on "Pronatalist Zealotry and Population Pressure Conflicts: How Catholics Seized Control of U.S. Family Planning Programs."[16] He described some of these activities:

> Following a meeting of Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter and his campaign staff with 15 Catholic leaders at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., on August 32, 1976, on which occasion they pressed Carter to deemphasize federal support for family planning in exchange for a modicum of Catholic support for his presidential race ... [following Carter's election] Joseph Califano became Secretary of HEW ... When Father Hesburgh [President of Notre Dame University] declined the role of AID Administrator, the appointment was given to John J. Gilligan, a Notre Dame graduate and a former governor of Ohio ... John H. Sullivan moved from [Wisconsin] Congressman Clement Zablocki's office into AID ... Congressman Zablocki and Jack Sullivan had persistently worked to curb AID's high powered family planning program. In 1973, Jack Sullivan and allied zealots helped Senator Jesse Helms develop the Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act.[16]

As in the case of the Rockefeller Commission Report, none of the recommendations of NSSM 200 was ever implemented. The study had identified a grave threat to U.S. and global security. It was a definitive analysis by the most powerful departments in our government – departments representing virtually all of our intelligence gathering capability. President Ford's approval of the policy recommendations of NSSM 200 in his Decision Memorandum 314 represented the high point of American political will to deal with the population problem. Then it plummeted.

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Dire Predictions Coming True

The Rockefeller Commission Report and NSSM 200 are arguably the two most important documents on overpopulation ever written. Our country and the world would be very different today if the recommendations contained in these two documents had been implemented. For example, had illegal immigration been controlled and legal immigration adjusted to meet the needs of Americans in 1971, as called for in the Rockefeller Commission Report, the U.S. population would have peaked at 243 million in 2035. Instead, in 1992 our population stood at 255 million and will not peak until it reaches 383 million in 2050--assuming there was no more immigration after 1992.[17] The lives of all Americans will be significantly affected as we attempt to accommodate these additional 128 million people. And this number can explode if we do not deal with current tides of immigration.

In 1974, NSSM 200 predicted that growing scarcities of critical resources would lead to ever increasing dislocations and conflicts all over the globe which would diminish security for everyone, everywhere. The January 31, 1993 issue of *The New York Times* contains an op-ed piece by Thomas Homer-Dixon, entitled "Destruction and Death," which documents that the predictions of NSSM 200 are already coming true around the globe. This article examines case-studies of violent conflicts which are attributed to overpopulation by researchers from four continents: the migration of millions from Bangladesh to India, which led to brutal ethnic conflicts; the persistent conflict in the Philippines driven by desperate poverty resulting from overpopulation; severe shortages of ground water in the Jordan River basin which are leading to intensified conflict between Israelis and Palestinians; destruction of ecologically sensitive territories in South Africa, forcing a migration to violent urban squatter settlements; expanding populations in Senegal and Mauritania which have spurred violent conflict in the Senegal River Basin; similar factors which have stimulated the growth of the Maoist Shining Path guerrillas in Peru; the irreversible clear-cutting of forests and loss of soil which has led to violent social strife in Haiti, and which in turn has caused an exodus of boat people. There are many other examples.

Maurice King of the University of Leeds School of Medicine

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has studied extensively the collapse of Rwanda:

> Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa, and has the highest fertility in the world (8.5 children per mother). The tragedy in Rwanda seems likely to be only the beginning, with Burundi likely to follow any day, and with perhaps southern Malawi, parts of Kenya and much of west Africa not far behind. Which other communities are trapped in that they are likely to exceed their carrying capacity and their connectedness? Aid agency executives and academics have at various times mentioned unofficially sizeable communities in: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Eastern Indonesia, The Philippines, Viet Nam, Haiti, The Maldives, Kenya, Nigeria, Malawi, The Gambia, Zanzibar, 'much of sub-Saharan Africa', and Cuba. These communities are in an earlier stage than Rwanda, which seems unlikely to be a unique case."[18]

NSSM 200 predicted that the U.S. would find itself in wars like the recent Iraq-U.S. war, as regional powers invade their neighbors to secure resources needed to provide for their ever expanding populations – just as Iraq invaded Kuwait. It also predicted that the expense of U.S. involvement in these wars would far exceed the costs of worldwide population growth control.

The Threat to Papal Authority Worldwide

Why is the Catholic Church obliged to halt legalized abortion and contraception despite the strong wishes of Americans? When our government legalized contraception and abortion, it pitted U.S. civil authority the against authority of the pope in Rome. The Vatican demands supremacy over civil governments in matters of faith and morals, but our government has rejected this concept. As a result, Papal authority is undermined.

There are many Catholic countries in Latin America which have abortion rates 2 to 4 times as high as the U.S. rate. But the bishops ignore abortions there. Why? Because they are illegal abortions, not legal ones. They do not threaten Papal authority! Only legal abortions do, because their legalization establishes their

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morality. Thus, the bishops take no significant actions to halt abortions in Latin America.

In *Papal Power: A Study of Vatican Control Over Lay Catholic Elites*,[19] published by The University of California Press in 1980, Jean-Guy Vaillancourt, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Montreal, closely examines the sources of papal power. It is derived in significant part from papal authority. If the Pope's authority is diminished, papal power is diminished. However, some authority is derived from papal power and if papal power is diminished, then authority is undermined. The relationship is circular. Less authority means less power which means even less authority. With diminishing power, survival of the institution of the Roman Catholic Church in its present hierarchical form is gravely threatened. Thus, the very survival of the Vatican is threatened by programs to control population growth.[20]

In April, 1992, in a rare public admission of this threat, Cardinal John O'Connor of New York, delivering a major address to the Franciscan University of Steubenville, acknowledged,

> The fact is that attacks on the Catholic Church's stance on abortion – unless they are rebutted – effectively erode Church authority on all matters, indeed on the authority of God himself.[21]

This threat was recognized decades ago by the Papal Commission on Population and Birth Control which met from 1964 until 1966. The Commission was created by Pope John XXIII but completed its work under Pope Paul IV. According to Commission member Thomas Burch, Pope Paul himself assigned the Commission the task of finding a way to modify the Church's position on birth control without destroying papal authority,[22] which is essential for the continued survival of the Vatican and the Catholic Church as we know it today. The Commission, of course, failed to find a way and the result was the encyclical *Humanae Vitae* which banned the use of contraception.

The Vatican clearly sees that if the solutions to the population problem are applied, the dominance of the papacy will be vitiated.

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Thus, it is in no position to compromise with our national policy. NSSM 200 forthrightly opposes Rome on population strategy, family planning and abortion. But the Vatican simply cannot adjust to U.S. security interests and survive in its present form.

The Rigidity of the Catholic Dogma on Family Planning

A thorough understanding of the Catholic principle of papal infallibility and how it evolved is needed to understand the reasoning that underlies the position now taken by the Holy See on contraception and abortion. Catholic theologian and historian, August Bernhard Hasler, in his book *How the Pope Became Infallible* (1979), explains this reasoning.[23] Hasler had served in the Vatican Secretariat for Christian Unity for five years during which he was given access to the Vatican Archives. There he discovered numerous documents which had not been studied before, revealing the history of Vatican Council I and adoption of the infallibility dogma in 1870.

Hasler learned that in 1870, the Papacy, until then a powerful institution, feared that it would soon face extinction.[24] Pope Pius IX and his advisors were convinced that a declaration of papal infallibility was vital to the continuation of papal authority. According to Catholic Sociologist Jean-Guy Vaillancourt:

> During the Middle Ages and under feudalism, when the Catholic Church was a dominant institution in society, papal power grew in importance, relying often on force to attain its ends, which were political as much as they were religious. The Crusades and, later on, the Inquisition, stand as the two most notorious of these violent papal ventures. But with the decline of the Portuguese and Spanish empires, with the advent of the Reformation and of the intellectual, democratic, and industrial revolutions, the Catholic hierarchy lost much of its influence and power. Unable to continue using physical coercion, the Papacy was led to strengthen its organizational structure and perfect a wide range of normative means of control. The declaration of papal infallibility by the first Vatican Council ... was an important milestone in that direction. The stress on the absolute authority of the pope in questions of faith and morals helped turn the

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> Church into a unified and powerful bureaucratic organization, and paved the way for the establishment of the Papacy-laity relationship as we know it today.[25]

Faced with the loss of most of its traditional sources of power, the Holy See recognized the enormous potential power offered by the dogma of Papal infallibility, since with it would come almost endless possibilities for normative means of control. Indeed, until the mid-1960s, when the Church began to self-destruct following the proclamation by Pope Paul VI of the papal encyclical *Humanae Vitae* banning contraception as intrinsically evil, this new arrangement worked just as Pius IX had hoped, and the Papacy continued to be a politically powerful institution.

However, in 1870, as Hasler discovered, the intellectual leadership of the Church was strongly opposed to the concept of papal infallibility on the grounds that some time in the future, as the world changed, the Church would find itself down some blind alley from which there would be no escape, with disintegration of the papacy inevitably following. In the 1870s, intellectual leaders left the Church in droves,[26] with no idea what the nature of the future "blind alley" would turn out to be.

We now know that the central issues of family planning are the blind alley. Recognizing this more than a century later, the renowned Swiss Catholic theologian, Hans Kung, wrote in his 31-page introduction to Hasler's book, "The only way to solve the problem of contraception is to solve the problem of infallibility."[27] Few dilemmas, if any, have received so much thought from so many intellectuals in the Church over the past few decades. No solution acceptable to the Holy See has been found.

Once the nature of the principle of infallibility and its origins are understood, it is evident that no solution to the birth control dilemma, short of the demise of the papacy as we know it, is likely. This became widely understood by Vatican decision-makers in the 1960s, as a result of Pope John XXIII's creation of the Papal Commission on Population and Birth Control, noted earlier. The two-tiered commission consisted of a group of 15 cardinals and bishops and a group of 64 lay experts representing a variety of disciplines.[28] Finding a way to change the Church's position on

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birth control without destroying papal authority was the *only* assignment given the Commission. The Commission failed. None was found.[29]

The failure came after the Commission studied the dilemma for two years. The laymen voted 60 to 4 and the clerics 9 to 6 to change the Church's teaching on birth control,[30] even though it would mean a loss of papal authority, because it was the right thing to do.[31] However, the minority also submitted a report to the pope. Among the authors of the minority report was Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, now Pope John Paul II. Hasler quotes from the minority report:

> If it should be declared that contraception is not evil in itself, then we should have to concede frankly that the Holy Spirit had been on the side of the Protestant churches in 1930 (when the encyclical *Casti connubii* was promulgated), in 1951 (Pius XII's address to the midwives), and in 1958 (the address delivered before the Society of Hematologists in the year the pope died). It should likewise have to be admitted that for a half a century the Spirit failed to protect Pius XI, Pius XII, and a large part of the Catholic hierarchy from a very serious error. This would mean that the leaders of the Church, acting with extreme imprudence, had condemned thousands of innocent human acts, forbidding, under pain of eternal damnation, a practice which would now be sanctioned. The fact can neither be denied nor ignored that these same acts would now be declared licit on the grounds of principles cited by the Protestants, which popes and bishops have either condemned or at least not approved.[32]

Thus, change in the Church's position at this point would mean destruction of the principle of papal infallibility. The logic of the minority report was flawless and the result was publication in 1968 of *Humanae Vitae*, banning the use of contraception as noted. But the problem was even deeper. As one examines the principle of infallibility and it origins, it becomes evident that as soon as this principle was adopted in 1870, it immediately became the fundamental principle of Catholic teaching and authority. If this principle is somehow destroyed, the foundation upon which all

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other Catholic principles rest is also destroyed. Pope John Paul II has said this in his own words. In a May 15, 1980 letter to the German Bishops' Conference, John Paul II said:

> I am convinced that the doctrine of infallibility is in a certain sense the key to the certainty with which the faith is confessed and proclaimed, as well as to the life and conduct of the faithful. For once this essential foundation is shaken or destroyed, the most basic truths of our faith likewise begin to break down.[33]

In these two quotes, Pope John Paul II acknowledges the obvious – and inevitable. Birth control had indeed become the "blind alley" the Church intellectuals so feared in 1870. The Church cannot change its position on birth control without destroying itself. The institution has defined morality in such a way as to attempt prevention of self-destruction – by asserting that birth control is morally wrong.

There is much wishful thinking that the next pope, or the pope after him, will support family planning. But this wishfulness does not take this dilemma into account and can be very destructive. Indeed, if I were a decision-maker in the Holy See, I would be spreading such wishful disinformation – in order to discourage any current efforts to confront the Vatican, forcefully and forthrightly, on the issues of abortion and contraception, a tenacious confrontation by people who are concerned, morally and practically about global stewardship – stewards who recognize that contraception and abortion are vital to the survival of our species – and many others.

Since his installation 17 years ago, Pope John Paul II has now appointed 84 percent of all voting cardinals. They are like-minded. There is precious little chance that the next pope, or the one following, will change the Church's position on family planning.

The Vatican and U. S. Immigration Policy

Many polls and studies show that U.S. Catholic lay couples exhibit the same family planning behavior as non-Catholics and hold the same beliefs about U.S. and world population growth.

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The Vatican is in conflict with many lay American Catholics on family planning, abortion and immigration. For example, a recent study by Catholic priest Andrew Greeley of the National Opinion Research Center found that only 7 percent of U.S. Catholics support the Vatican position on abortion.[34] The security-survival interests of the Catholic laymen are pitted against the security-survival interests of the Papacy. For many reasons – economic, medical, and social – family planning enhances the security of the layman and his/her family and increase their odds of survival and well being. But, family planning, abortion, etc., because they undermine papal authority, also undermine the security of the Papacy and threaten its very survival.

Likewise, Vatican demands for open borders of the U.S. are rejected by a large majority of U.S. Catholics.[35] American Catholic lay persons are statistically as opposed to unrestricted immigration into the United States as non-Catholic Americans. Yet, a recent study of the positions of religious denominations in the U.S. toward immigration highlighted the role played by the Catholic church in respect of large-scale immigration:

> No religious group wields more power on behalf of high immigration to the U.S. than the Catholic Church. Thanks to the 1880-1914 and 1970-present Great Waves of immigration consisting primarily of Catholics, the Church towers over all other American religious groups. Its 59 million members give it immense financial, institutional and political clout, even though polls suggest the majority of its members probably don't agree with its pro-immigration stances.[36]

A November 8, 1992, *National Catholic Register* article reveals why the Vatican is taking these positions. In it, Father Richard J. Ryscavage, executive director of the Migration and Refugee Services of the U.S. Catholic Conference noted that immigration is the

> growing edge of Catholicism in the United States ... We are in the middle of a huge wave of immigration ... and most of them are Catholics ... It's the key to our future and the key to why the

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Church is going to be very healthy in the 21st century.

Another recent study[37] examines some of the Catholic leadership stances which many Americans will find shocking: *Catholic leaders assert that the U.S. does not have an inherent right to limit migration*; that every human has a right to migrate to the U.S. and take up residence there – to seek better living conditions; that the Catholic Church rejects the concept of national sovereignty; that all immigrants and their offspring have a right to keep their native language primarily; that most immigration restrictions are immoral; that the U.S. government distinction between political and economic refugees is unacceptable. These are all official papal positions. The author of this study is David Simcox. He is a Roman Catholic, a former foreign service officer, and the first executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), 1985-1992. He offers the following comment:

> Archbishop Roger Mahony of Los Angeles, who presides over the United States' largest concentration of illegal aliens, put it in these terms: 'If the question is between the right of a nation to control its borders and the right of a person to emigrate in order to seek safe haven from hunger or violence (or both), we believe that the first right must give way to the second'(1987).

The reasons for American lay Catholic opposition to the Vatican's stance on unrestricted immigration into the U.S. are obvious. While the security-survival of the Papacy is greatly enhanced by this migration, as described by Ryscavage, the security-survival of Catholic layman and their families is undermined economically, educationally, medically, socially and in other ways bearing on the quality of life. Thus, as with family planning and abortion, the security-survival interests of the Catholic layman is pitted against the security-survival interests of the Papacy.

The Vatican Claims Protection from "Harmful Laws"

The Vatican claims the right to protect itself against "harmful

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laws" – even when democratically legislated! The central difficulty here, of course, is that what the Vatican considers "harmful" to itself and its authority often is exactly what lay Catholic men and women thoughtfully consider beneficial to themselves and their families. In a letter to American bishops from the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith – the most powerful Vatican office – Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger reminded the bishops that "The Church has the responsibility to protect herself from the application of harmful laws." This letter was keep secret from 55 million American Catholics until a brief notice written by Peter Steinfels for *The New York Times* appeared July 10, 1992. The actual text remained hidden from the public until it was leaked to the press on July 15, 1992.[38] Obviously, if an institution has the "responsibility," it also claims the "right." The Vatican exercised its "right" to protect itself from the application of harmful laws, in the autocratic way it defines as "harmful," when it blocked U.S. adoption of the Rockefeller Commission recommendations and implementation of the NSSM 200 policies approved by President Ford. "To protect herself," the Church moved quickly and efficiently to kill the two most important initiatives to control population growth in American history.

The Bishops' "Pastoral Plan"

Two decades ago the Vatican determined that if it were to survive, it must become much more active in U.S. politics at the national level. Up until this time the Vatican's involvement was more concentrated at the local level than national. Vatican influence over politics in large Catholic cities is well known and undisputed. Then the bishops decided that only by being highly organized and active politically on *all* levels of government could the Vatican overcome the mounting surge of political will seeking world population growth control.

On November 20, 1975, the American Catholic bishops issued their *Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities*.[39] This was just 6 days before President Ford made NSSM 200 public policy. The success of their Pastoral Plan is confirmed in an excellent February 24, 1992 article in *Time* which I will touch on later.

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This Plan is a frank and superbly detailed blueprint of the bishops' strategy for influencing and working through the American democratic process at the national, state and local levels. It maps out a national political machine controlled by the bishops. A prime purpose of the Plan is to kill the political will of the United States to seriously tackle the global overpopulation problem. In the Plan, abortion was the issue chosen to galvanize the movement as proposed by Jesuit priest Virgil Blum in his 1971 *America* magazine article.[40] The Plan details a 3-pronged attack, one devoted to each of the three branches of our federal government: legislative, judicial and administrative.

As the *Time* article shows, with the election of anti-abortion Ronald Reagan and anti-abortion George Bush in 1980, the views of the Vatican gained substantial influence within the administrative branch of the U.S. government in the area of population and family planning policy. In their 12 years, these two presidents appointed 5 Supreme Court Justices and 70 percent of all sitting judges in the federal court system. All were anti-abortion, another goal of the Pastoral Plan. The legislative branch has been more difficult for those opposed to family planning, although they did achieve sufficient influence in Congress to the extent that pro-choice Congressmen could not override a presidential veto of family planning bills. As long as the anti-family planning interests controlled the White House, however, this was sufficient for their purposes. As noted earlier, even in the Carter years, the bishops were highly successful in undermining federal government population growth control efforts.

During the period 1976-1980, all of the organizations that became known as the "New Right Movement" were created, with one exception: The Christian Coalition was created later to replace the Moral Majority. In their Plan, the bishops said they were favored such a movement. Catholics were key players in the creation of all of these organizations and influential in their leadership. This assessment of the creation of this movement and the influence in it of the bishops is well documented.[41,42] Many Protestant churches, especially some of the Fundamentalist denominations, feel that their institutions are threatened by the solutions to the population problem. Their members are serving

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in the ranks of the so-called New Right Movement and their influence has been pivotal to the policies of that Movement.

***TIME* Magazine says the Pope Calls the Tune**

The February 24, 1992 issue of *TIME* magazine published a story on the alliance between Reagan and the Pope to undermine Communism in Poland, by Pulitzer prize-winning journalist Carl Bernstein, which included significant revelations about matters other than the overthrow of Communism. According to Bernstein:

> *The Catholic Team*: The key Administration players were all devout Roman Catholics – CIA chief William Casey, [Richard] Allen [Reagan's first National Security Advisor], [William] Clark [Reagan's second National Security Advisor], [Alexander] Haig [Secretary of State], [Vernon] Walters [Ambassador at Large] and William Wilson, Reagan's first ambassador to the Vatican. They regarded the U.S.-Vatican relationship as a holy alliance: the moral force of the Pope and the teachings of their church combined with ... their notion of American Democracy.

In a section of his article headed "The U.S. and the Vatican on Birth Control," Bernstein includes three more revealing paragraphs:

> In response to concerns of the Vatican, the Reagan Administration agreed to alter its foreign aid program to comply with the church's teachings on birth control. According to William Wilson, the President's first ambassador to the Vatican, the State Department reluctantly agreed to an outright ban on the use of any U.S. aid funds by either countries or international health organizations for the promotion of ... abortions. As a result of this position, announced at the World Conference on Population in Mexico City in 1984, the U.S. withdrew funding from, among others, two of the world's largest family planning organizations: the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities.'
>
> 'American policy was changed as a result of the Vatican's not agreeing with our policy,' Wilson writes, 'American aid programs

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> around the world did not meet the criteria the Vatican had for family planning. AID [the Agency for International Development] sent various people from [the Department of] State to Rome, and I'd accompany them to meet the president of the Pontifical Council for the Family, and in long discussions they finally got the message. But it was a struggle. They finally selected different programs and abandoned others as a result of this intervention.'
>
> 'I might have touched on that in some of my discussions with [CIA director William] Casey,' acknowledges Pio Cardinal Laghi, the former apostolic delegate to Washington. 'Certainly Casey already knew about our positions about that.'

Thus Bernstein indicates what the cadre of devout Catholics in the Reagan Administration did to protect the Papacy from NSSM 200. He quotes our ambassador to the Vatican, William Wilson, who reveals that during the Reagan Administration, Papal policy on birth control and abortion, in effect, simply replaced the policy set forth by NSSM 200. (The bishops enjoyed considerable success with their Pastoral Plan at the state level as well.)[43]

Presidents Reagan and Bush were arguably the most pro-Catholic Presidents in American history. The bishops gained influence over the Republican party just as they set out to do, according to their Pastoral Plan. In November 1992, outgoing Republican National Committee Chairman Richard Bond told the members of that committee on January 29, 1993, that it was time for the Republican Party to abandon the papal position on abortion. Bond said that the party should not be governed by "zealotry masquerading as principle."[44]

Silence Cloaks NSSM 200

Although President Ford endorsed the recommendations of NSSM 200 on November 26, 1975, the report was never printed. There are only a handful of photocopies available. Those who wrote the report recommended that it be classified for 5 years. Werner Fornos, President of the Population Institute, with the aid of several members of Congress, succeeded in getting the NSSM 200 report declassified for a brief period in 1976. Despite his best

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efforts, and the explosiveness of the report, he was unable to achieve any press coverage whatsoever. Instead, he soon found the report reclassified as a result of the objections of "members of the national security establishment" to the early declassification.[45]

In the end, the document remained classified for 14 years, rather than the recommended 5 years. The only institution that benefits from this continued silence is the Roman Catholic Church. Says James Scheuer,

> The Roman Catholic Church and its allies cannot be allowed to dictate the rules of the game when it comes to the preservation of life on this planet, at some level of decency.[4]

Congressman Scheuer put it succinctly:

> The issue of population growth is too crucial to the future welfare of our nation and of the world to be left to...the Roman Catholic hierarchy and its allies in the fundamentalist movement.[4]

In Summary

NSSM 200's most important accomplishment was that it defined U.S. security interests regarding world population growth control, and identified the opponents of population growth control as enemies of the United States. U.S. security interests are personal and profound for us all: the peace, well-being and prospects of the American people. Papal security-survival along with the influence of fundamentalist Protestant opposition to birth control is now pitted against the U.S. and world security-survival. Intervention is now crucial if the overpopulation trajectory projected by NSSM 200 is to be broken. The alternative is chaos and ecologic disaster.

Political will has always been the most crucial element in seeking solutions to the population crisis. No matter how concerned we are as individuals or organizations, nothing substantial and significant is likely to happen to reach our goals in this endeavor without mobilizing our political will as a nation. Therefore we must direct our energies now to identifying obstructions to rebuilding our political will to deal with overpopulation and converting this will to action.

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We have everything to lose – and so very much to save.

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"A fascinating and disturbing insight into a population policy that could have changed the world but for the machinations of the Vatican."

— *Tim Black, Chief Executive*
Marie Stopes International

THE LIFE AND DEATH OF NSSM 200

How the Destruction of Political Will Doomed a U.S. Population Policy

Stephen D. Mumford

CHAPTERS

- *President Nixon's "Special Message" on Population*
- *The "Rockefeller Commission" on Population Growth*
- *Nixon's NSSM 200 Directive and the Complete Study Report*
- *President Ford's Move Toward a U.S. Population Policy*
- *What Happened to the Momentum?*
- *Why Did Our Political Will Fade Away?*
- *What Was the Role of the Vatican?*
- *The Bishops' "Pastoral Plan"*
- *Implications of the Pastoral Plan*
- *The Human Life Amendment—and Beyond*
- *The Cross of Papal Infallibility*
- *Postponing Self-Destruction of the Church*
- *Defection of the Faithful*
- *"Things Are Seldom What They Seem"*

"NSSM" is White House shorthand for "National Security Study Memorandum." NSSM 200 was the definitive interagency study of world population growth and its implications for U.S. and global security, requested by President Nixon in 1974. **It concluded that sustained rapid world population growth had become a danger of the highest magnitude, calling for urgent measures to avoid severe damage to world economic, political and ecological systems, and to our humanitarian values.** Subsequently, President Ford reviewed the study and wrote recently, "I endorsed the 227 page NSSM 200 report in 1975, in National Security Decision Memorandum 314. My views are the same today."

"In *The Life and Death of NSSM 200*, Dr. Mumford gives us a uniquely clear account of how the Vatican manipulated the American government, causing it to distance itself from the compassionate control of population. Tragically, the relevance of this keen analysis grows with every new population-fueled horror."

— *Garrett Hardin*
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA

"*The Life and Death of NSSM 200* does a major service in calling attention to the strong link between world overpopulation and U.S. national security. The point needs to be hammered home. Americans have perhaps begun to see the connection in the cases of Somalia, El Salvador, and Haiti, but the media unfortunately continues to concentrate on proximate and superficial political events. Population policy should be central to foreign policy."

— *Edward O. Wilson*
Pellegrino University Professor, Harvard University
Museum of Comparative Zoology, The Agassiz Museum

"This book gives extremely helpful background information about the hidden coordination of Vatican and American policy with regard to population growth and birth control. It is high time that certain problematic maneuvers of the Vatican are discussed in public."

— *Dr. Hans Küng, Catholic theologian*
Professor of Ecumenical Theology and Director of the Institute for Ecumenical Research
University of Tübingen, Germany

"To understand the demise of NSSM 200 is to begin to understand why U.S. policymakers still will not act to solve the problem of population growth. Dr. Mumford's book represents decades of intensive scholarship and is an important contribution to this controversial and complex subject. We are grateful that this book is being published."

— *Monique A. Miller*
Executive Director
Carrying Capacity Network

"In the long run the security of the United States cannot be divorced from the security of all nations. Nor can our security be measured solely in military terms...The information in this book will be of enormous value to those in the U.S. and elsewhere who wish to encourage elected officials to recognize the need to develop policies and programs that address the problems resulting from the world's rapid population growth."

— *Gene R. La Rocque*
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)
President, Center for Defense Information

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Occupational Choice and Wage Differentials: Theory and Application in Israel*

Tikva Lecker
Bar-Ilan University

I. Introduction

The theories of human capital investment and economic discrimination taken together suggest that gaps in the average wages of different groups occur both because of differences in their human capital resources and in their market evaluations. These theories stimulated the development of methods for decomposing wage differentials (Oaxaca, 1973 and Blinder, 1973) which were generalized by Cotton (1988), Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1992).

This paper discusses the impact of occupational participation on the decomposition of wage differentials. Traditionally, wage differentials are decomposed into human capital and discrimination components. Thus if an individual's occupation is one of the variables of the wage equation the usual wage-differential decomposition will automatically add the differences in the distribution of occupations to the human capital component. However, since market evaluations vary, differences in the distributions of occupations may be due to discrimination. Thus, including this variable in the wage equations requires a special treatment which will take into account the probabilities of entering the various occupations. This paper shows that the calculation of these probabilities will enable us to determine the component of the wage differential to which differences in the occupational distribution belong.

The empirical analysis will deal with wage differentials between two ethnic groups among the sons of immigrants to Israel. The next section presents the conceptual framework. Data sources are described in the third section followed by the statistical analysis while

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the main findings appear in the fourth section. A summary and conclusions are presented in the final section.

II. The Theoretical Framework

The wage function for the analysis is defined in semilogarithmic form as:

$$\log W_i = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{n} \beta_j X_j + \epsilon_1$$

where W_i is the wage of the individual i and X_j ($j = 1 \ldots n$) are the independent variables measuring different elements of an individual's human capital. When the wage differential has the form:

$$W = \alpha + \beta X$$

and the parameters of two compared groups (1 and 2) are not identical ($\alpha_1 \neq \alpha_2$ and $\beta_1 \neq \beta_2$) the wage differential between these two groups may be written as:

$$\Delta W = W_1 - W_2 = (\alpha_i + \beta_i X_i) - (\alpha_2 + \beta_2 X_2)$$

This wage differential (ΔW) can be decomposed into two components: the explained one, which stems from different levels of the individuals' resources (vector X) and the unexplained one, which is due to differences in the market evaluation of these resources (α and β). Thus, the decomposition can be either:

$$\Delta W = \Delta \alpha + X_1 \Delta \beta + \beta_2 \Delta X$$

or

$$\Delta W = \Delta \alpha + X_2 \Delta \beta + \beta_1 \Delta X$$

where $\Delta\alpha = \alpha_1 - \alpha_2$, $\Delta\beta = \beta_1 - \beta_2$ and $\Delta X = X_{j1} - X_{j2}$. the first two terms on the right-hand side of (4) and (5) are estimates of the "characteristics" effects (the unexplained component) while the third term refers to the "market" effect (the explained component) of the

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wage differential (see, for example, Cotton, 1988).

Let us denote the individual's occupation by Z and separate it from the other elements of vector X. The wage equation will now be:

$$W=\alpha+\beta X+\gamma Z$$

and similarly,

$$\Delta W=\Delta\alpha+X_1\Delta\beta+Z_1\Delta\gamma+\beta_2\Delta X+\gamma_2\Delta Z$$

or

$$\Delta W=\Delta\alpha+X_2\Delta\beta+Z_2\Delta\gamma+\beta_1\Delta X+\gamma_1\Delta Z$$

where $\Delta\gamma = \gamma_1 - \gamma_2$ and $\Delta Z = 1$ when the occupations are different and $\Delta Z = 0$ when they are identical.

According to the usual decomposition, $\gamma_2\Delta Z$ (or $\gamma_1\Delta Z$) will automatically belong to the category of the explained wage gap which is due to differences in the individuals' human capital endowments between the two groups. However, the term $\gamma_2\Delta Z$ (or $\gamma_1\Delta Z$) which shows the differences in the distributions of occupations between the two compared groups, may express discrimination and not differences between the human capital levels of the two groups. The answer to the question as to whether such occupational differences belong to the category of differences in human capital or whether they also reflect discrimination, should depend upon the probability of belonging to the different occupations. If, for a given level of human capital, there are no differences in these probabilities, wage gaps due to differences in the occupational distribution should be assigned to differences in human capital. But, if for a given level of human capital, there are differences in these probabilities, the wage differentials due to differences in the occupational distribution will also reflect discrimination and thus should belong to the category of market effect.

Thus, adding the individuals' occupations in the wage equation requires the estimation of the probabilities of belonging to the various occupations before decomposing the overall wage gap. Such an estimation can be made using logit functions which will include the individual's human capital variables.

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III. Data and Sample Description

The data for the empirical analysis were derived from the 1972 and 1983 Israeli Census of Population (20% questionnaire). The study deals with two groups of immigrants to Israel – one from Iraq, a mid-Eastern country and the other from Romania, an east European country (see Bensky *et al.*, 1991).[1] Two generations were differentiated among these immigrants; the first generation includes those who when immigrating to Israel between 1948 and 1951 were more than ten years old while the second generation includes those who immigrated to Israel during the same period but were younger than ten, as well as those who were born in Israel.[2]

The occupations were divided into two categories (high and low) according to the one digit level definition of the occupations. The high category includes managers, professionals and technical workers, sales and skilled workers and the low includes service and unskilled workers.

The wage gaps between the two groups were examined among male employees in both generations in 1972 and 1983.[3] Table 1 presents the profile of the two ethnic groups by year and by generation.

Table 1 shows that in both groups the level of education of the second generation is higher than that of the first and in both generations the males of Romanian origin have a higher level of education than the males of Iraqi origin. Moreover, the percentage of males of Romanian origin in the high occupations category and their wages are higher than those of males of Iraqi origin in both years and also in both generations. In order to study the impact of

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[1] During the years 1948-51 there was a massive Jewish immigration to Israel which more than doubled the Jewish population from 650,000 in 1948 to 1,500,000 in 1952. The immigrants who came from Asian-African countries are collectively referred to as 'Orientals' (Easterners) and those who came from the European-American countries are referred to as 'Ashkenazis' (Westerners). Wage differentials exist between these two large ethnic groups in Israel (see Amir, 1988). This study examines the wage gaps between the immigrants from Iraq, one ethnic group which is part of the Easterners, and the immigrants from Romania, an ethnic group belonging to the Westerners.

[2] For the detailed justification for this distinction between generations see Bensky *et al.*, 1991, Ch. 2.

[3] Only the male employees who worked at least 50 weeks in the year of the Census were included in the statistical analysis.

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Table 1
Sample Characteristics of Two Ethnic Groups in Israel
by Year and Generation (Males)[a]

Variable	1972				1983			
	Iraqi Origin		Rumanian Origin		Iraqi Origin		Rumanian Origin	
	Gen. 1	Gen. 2	Gen. 1	Gen. 2	Gen. 1	Gen. 2	Gen. 1	Gen. 2
Monthly wage (in Israeli shekels)[b]	1272 (720)	1064 (659)	1486 (843)	1302 (744)	2132 (1814)	1949 (1588)	2411 (1858)	2625 (2609)
Years of schooling	8.0 (4.6)	9.5 (2.6)	9.0 (3.9)	11.7 (3.0)	9.0 (4.6)	10.9 (2.9)	10.0 (4.0)	13.2 (3.0)
Experience	31.0 (10.4)	10.0 (4.6)	34.5 (11.5)	8.0 (4.0)	38.1 (8.2)	15.0 (6.9)	39.9 (9.4)	12.6 (6.2)
Last school attended (%)								
Intermediate school	57.8	48.7	55.3	23.5	52.0	31.1	49.5	10.1
Vocational high school	5.4	28.9	13.9	36.1	8.0	40.1	17.1	34.2
General high school	25.9	14.9	18.9	15.2	25.6	12.2	15.9	11.7
Post-high school institutions and universities	10.9	7.5	11.9	25.2	14.4	16.6	17.5	44.0
Occupational category (%)								
High	13.1	11.1	15.6	31.3	18.9	19.9	24.9	43.4
Medial	59.2	76.0	63.7	61.9	58.9	66.7	60.5	47.9
Low	27.7	12.9	20.7	6.8	22.2	13.4	14.6	8.7
Sample size	3079	2008	2615	811	2249	3946	1753	1991

a: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
b: Values at 1989 prices.

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Table 2
Wage Differentials and their Decomposition
between Jewish Male Employees of Rumanian and Iraqi Origin (percent)[a]

	First Generation		Second Generation		
	1972	1983	1972	1983	1983
Wage gap	15.0	11.7	21.3	29.4	29.4
Human-capital effect					
Education	9.1	4.8	25.4	28.1	22.4
Experience	-9.6	-7.1	-18.0	-7.7	-7.7
Occupation	-	-	-	-	4.8
Total[b]	-0.5	-2.1	6.4	19.0	19.6
Market-evaluation effect	15.6	14.1	14.2	8.8	8.2

a: Positive wage gaps mean higher wages for the Rumanian origin while negative mean higher wages for the Iraqi origin.

Dash (-) means that the variable is not entered.

b: The total effect is not the algebraic sum of the sub-effects of education and experience but their multiplication.

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Figure 1

Wage differentials (in percents) between males of Rumanian and Iraqi origin by age groups in 1972 and 1983



Table 3
Estimates of the Probabilities of Belonging to the High-Occupations Category for Male Employees in the Second Generation

Country of Origin	1972	1983
Iraq		
Direct calculation	0.065	0.145
Indirect calculation	0.139	0.150
Rumania		
Direct calculation	0.208	0.364
Indirect calculation	0.099	0.366

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time on the wage gaps between these two groups, the wage differential was estimated separately in 1972 and 1983 for each age group. These wage gaps are shown in Table 4 in the Appendix which shows the clear advantage of males of Romanian origin.

Figure 1 indicates that the wage gap (for the two generations together) as a function of age, behaves in an inverse U-shaped form, in 1972 as well as in 1983. The peak corresponds to the age group 41-45. Note also that in 1983 the entire curve is above that of 1972, so that it clearly appears that the wage gap increased over time.

IV. Statistical Analysis

In the first stage of the statistical analysis, wage equations, without the individual's occupation, were estimated separately for both groups in 1972 and 1983. Then the standard decomposition was applied to these estimated equations. In the second stage occupation was included in the wage equations and, according to the theoretical suggestions presented in Section II, the probabilities of entering the various occupations were calculated for each group and then the wage differentials were decomposed again. At each stage the wage differentials were decomposed in two steps. Firstly, a decomposition into the characteristics effects and the market effect was performed. Then in the second step, the characteristics components were decomposed into sub-components referring to the various elements of the individuals' endowments. The decomposition corresponding to the second stage was done only for the second generation in 1983.

A. Wage gaps excluding the individuals' occupation

In the first stage of the analysis the estimated wage equations included as exogenous variables, the years of schooling, years of experience in the labor market,[4] number of hours of work per week and dummy variables for the last school which the worker completed (these wage equations are presented in Tables 5 and 6 of the Appendix). The number of the individual's hours of work per week was included in order to distinguish between the wage gaps which are due to differences in the individuals' supply of labor and those which

[4] Years of experience in the labor market are defined as age minus years of schooling minus six. Military service is included in the experience.

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Table 4
Wage Gaps between Males of Rumanian and Iraqi Origin
by Age Group in 1972 and 1983

Age Groups in		Wage Gaps (percents) in	
1972	1983	1972	1983
15-19	25-30	10.4	27.7
20-25	31-35	13.0	31.8
26-30	36-40	22.9	43.0
31-35	41-45	27.4	47.6
36-40	46-50	36.6	25.1
41-45	51-55	34.8	33.2
46-50	56-60	17.4	14.4
51-55	61-65	10.3	2.6
56-60	66+	18.3	1.6
61-65		9.4	

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Table 5
Wage Equations for Employees - Males of Rumanian and Iraqi Origin in 1972 (without the occupation variable)[a]

Variable	Rumania		Iraq	
	First Gen.	Second Gen.	First Gen.	Second Gen.
Intercept	5.18** (27.4)	4.17** (18.4)	5.32** (8.13)	3.87** (26.3)
Years of schooling	0.06** (5.4)	0.10** (6.0)	0.04** (4.0)	0.11** (8.2)
Years of experience	0.05** (6.5)	0.19** (6.0)	0.03** (4.0)	0.22** (13.7)
(Years of experience)^2	-0.0007** (8.8)	-0.006** (6.3)	-0.0004** (5.3)	-0.006** (12.4)
Schooling x experience	-0.001** (5.4)	-O.0002 (1.2)	-0.0004 (1.8)	-0.005** (5.5)
Weekly work-hours	0.01** (12.5)	0.01** (6.3)	0.01** (12.5)	0.01** (9.5)
Dummies for last school				
Intermediate school	0.09** (2.4)	-0.08 (0.8)	0.05 (1.0)	-0.03 (0.4)
Vocational school	0.17** (4.9)	0.06 (1.0)	0.11** (2.6)	0.05 (1.4)
General high school	0.12** (3.6)	-0.008 (0.1)	0.14** (4.7)	0.07 (1.8)
Post-high school institutions and universities	0.31** (6.0)	0.02 (0.2)	0.37** (7.9)	0.07 (1.0)
R^2	0.305	0.307	0.263	0.349
Adjusted R^2	0.303	0.299	0.261	0.346
Sample size	2615	811	3079	2008

a: The dependent variable is the logarithmic monthly gross wage.
Figures in parentheses are χ^2 statistics.
* and ** indicate the coefficient significant at $\alpha = 0.05$ and $\alpha = 0.01$, respectively.

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Table 6
Wage Equations for Employees - Males of Rumanian and Iraqi Origin in 1983 (without the occupation variable)[a]

Variable	Rumania		Iraq	
	First Gen.	Second Gen.	First Gen.	Second Gen.
Intercept	8.6**	7.95*	7.8**	8.2**
	(16.7)	(38.9)	(17.8)	(57.8)
Years of schooling	0.04*	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**
	(1.9)	(5.6)	(4.0)	(6.2)
Years of experience	0.05**	0.12**	0.08**	0.08**
	(2.8)	(6.6)	(4.3)	(7.1)
(Years of experience)^2	-0.0008**	-0.003**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(4.5)	(7.9)	(5.4)	(6.5)
Schooling x experience	-0.0007**	-0.0002	-0.001**	-0.0007
	(1.4)	(0.2)	(2.8)	(1.3)
Weekly work-hours	0.02**	0.008**	0.01**	0.01**
	(11.0)	(7.5)	(9.4)	(11.8)
Dummies for last school				
Intermediate school	0.09*	0.26**	0.18**	0.14**
	(1.9)	(4.9)	(3.2)	(4.9)
Vocational school	0.13**	0.24**	0.22**	0.14**
	(2.7)	(3.9)	(5.6)	(3.7)
General high school	0.36**	0.42**	0.42**	0.34**
	(4.3)	(6.2)	(6.0)	(6.3)
Post-high school institutions and universities	0.33**	0.34**	0.56**	0.31**
	(4.5)	(4.6)	(8.3)	(5.2)
R^2	0.303	0.270	0.299	0.203
Adjusted R^2	0.300	0.266	0.296	0.201
Sample size	1753	1991	2249	3946

a. The dependent variable is the logarithmic monthly gross wage.

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Table 7
The Logit Regressions for Employees -
Males of Rumanian and Iraqi Origin in the Second Generation[a]

Variable	1972		1983	
	Rumania	Iraq	Rumania	Iraq
Intercept	5.7** (31.3)	-8.8** (95.0)	-7.7** (152)	-7.7** (262)
Years of schooling	0.28** (14.8)	0.48** (34.9)	0.36** (92.6)	0.34** (81.3)
Dummies for last school:				
Intermediate school	0.78* (4.5)	-0.18 (0.3)	-	-
Vocational high school	1.15** (8.3)	-0.26 (0.48)	0.33 (1.5)	0.58** (8.6)
General high school	3.17** (22.2)	0.75 (1.6)	0.6* (3.9)	0.65** (8.2)
Post-high school institutions and universities	2.2** (20.8)	0.48 (0.57)	-	-
Post-high school institutions	-	-	1.58** (26.4)	2.0** (51.4)
University	-	-	1.3** (16.2)	1.7** (26.8)
Age	0.03 (0.7)	0.06* (5.2)	0.05** (25.9)	0.05** (30.0)
Sample size	682	1895	1890	3755

a. The dependent variable (H) is high occupations category participation.
$H = 1$ if the employee works in high occupations category.
Figures in parentheses are χ^2 statistics.
Dash (-) means variable not entered.
* and ** indicate the coefficient significant at $\alpha = 0.05$ and $\alpha = 0.01$, respectively.

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APPENDIX - Table 8
Wage Equations for Employees - Males of Rumanian and Iraqi Origin in the Second Generation (with the occupation variable)[a]

Variable	1972		1983	
	Rumania	Iraq	Rumania	Iraq
Intercept	4.2** (16.9)	3.8** (25.0)	8.1** (38.3)	8.3** (58.2)
Years of schooling	0.09** (5.1)	0.11** (7.7)	0.06** (4.4)	0.06** (5.4)
Years of experience	0.18** (5.3)	0.22** (13.4)	0.12** (6.3)	0.08** (6.9)
(Years of experience)^2	-0.006** (5.6)	-0.006** (12.3)	-0.003** (7.6)	-0.001** (6.5)
Schooling x experience	-0.002 (1.0)	-0.005** (5.4)	-0.003** (7.6)	-0.001 (1.0)
Weekly work-hours	0.01** (6.0)	0.01** (9.4)	0.009** (7.6)	0.009** (11.0)
Occupation category (high = 1)	0.02 (0.5)	0.06 (1.5)	0.22** (6.3)	0.24** (8.3)
Dummies for last school:				
Intermediate school	0.08 (1.5)	0.05 (1.7)	-	-
Vocational school	0.06 (0.8)	0.08* (2.0)	0.27** (5.0)	0.14** (4.8)
General high school	-0.02 (0.2)	0.07 (0.07)	0.22** (3.5)	0.13** (3.3)
Post-high school institutions and universities	0.08 (0.8)	-0.02 (0.2)	-	-
Post-high school institutions	-	-	0.36** (5.1)	0.23** (4.1)
University	-	-	0.29** (3.9)	0.19** (3.1)
R^2	0.312	0.358	0.283	0.221
Adjusted R^2	0.302	0.355	0.279	0.219
Sample size	681	1894	1889	3754

a. The dependent variable is the logarithmic monthly gross wage.

Figures in parentheses are χ^2 statistics.
Dash (-) means variable not entered.
* and ** indicate the coefficient significant at $\alpha = 0.05$ and $\alpha = 0.01$, respectively.

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are due to differences in their human capital.

The wage differentials between males of Romanian and Iraqi origin and their decompositions are presented in Table 2 (at this moment the right-hand column is not relevant).[5]

Table 2 shows that in both 1972 and 1983 the wage gaps were in favor of the males of Romanian origin, this being true for both generations. In each year, the wage gaps in the second generation were higher than those in the first. The wage gaps for the first generation decreased from 15.0 percent in 1972 to 11.7 percent in 1983 while that for the second generation increased from 21.3 percent in 1972 to 29.4 percent in 1983. A similar decomposition of the wage gaps for the first generation was obtained in 1972 and in 1983. In both years the wages of the males of Romanian origin were higher than those of the males of Iraqi origin because of differences in the market evaluation, which favored the Romanians. The characteristics effects of the wage gap for this generation was even in favor of the Iraqis, 0.5 percent in 1972 and 2.1 percent in 1983. For the second generation the picture is different. The market effect of the wage gap decreased from two-thirds in 1972 (14.2 of 21.3 percent) to one-third in 1983 (8.8 of 29.4 percent).

B. Wage gaps with the occupational variable

In the second stage of the statistical analysis the individual' s occupation was added to the wage equations and they were then reestimated. The probability of belonging to the various occupations was estimated by a logit function where the dependent variable was equal to one when the employee worked in the high categories of occupations and to zero otherwise (see Nerlove and Press, 1973). The independent variables in these equations were the same as in the wage equations in the first stage of the analysis except for the individual's hours of work per week, which were excluded. The logit equations were estimated for each group separately, and only for the second generation (see Table 7 in the Appendix), applying the Oaxaca (1973) method to the logit functions estimating the probability of belonging the high category occupation, i.e., for each group,

[5] The wage equations of the males of Romanian origin were the basis of the decompositions of the wage differentials.

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these probabilities were calculated twice, once directly by substituting its average levels of the independent variable into its own logit equation and once, indirectly, by substituting the same averages into the equation of the second group.[6]

Table 3 gives the average probabilities for both groups in 1972 and 1983. In those years, the probabilities for the workers of Iraqi origin were lower than those of Romanian. However, the resources of the gaps between these probabilities are different. This table shows that in 1983 substituting the average level of personal characteristics of the workers in the logit equation of their group (direct calculation) or in the other group's equation (indirect calculation) gave the same results, i.e., in 1983 the differences in these probabilities were due to the differences in the level of human capital of the two groups. In 1972 the direct and indirect calculations gave different results, i.e., in this year most of the differences were due to different market evaluations of the human capital of the two groups, (discrimination).

Thus, in the decomposition of the wage gaps, in a case of a significant effect of the occupation variable on wages, the effect of occupation on wage differentials in 1972 will be included in the market effect whereas in 1983 it will be included in the characteristic effects. The wage equations which were estimated again with the occupation variable for each group in 1972 and 1983 (see Table 8 in the Appendix) show that for 1972 the coefficients of the occupation variable were insignificant while for 1983 they were significant. Thus, the decomposition is relevant for 1983 only.

The two right-hand columns in Table 2 present the decomposition of the wage gaps in 1983 among the second generation of Romanian and Iraqi immigrants to Israel with the occupation variable and without it.[7] Table 2 shows that in 1983 the inclusion of the occupation variable does not affect the decomposition of the wage differential between the two major categories (the human-capital effect and the market effect) but changes the division within the human-capital differences. Thus, 4.8 percent of the wage gap of 29.4 percent do not reflect a real gap in the levels of education of the two groups but reflect the fact that the high category of occupations rewards the

[6] In the same analysis for the first generation, which is not reported in this paper, the coefficients of the occupation variable were insignificant for 1972 and 1983 as well.
[7] The effect of the number of work hours per week on the wage was excluded.

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worker beyond his real level of education. The practical meaning of this result is that a movement of workers from the low to the high category of occupations will decrease the wage gaps (by about 5 percent) for the same differences in the levels of endowments.

V. Summary and Conclusions

According to the standard wage-differential decomposition, differences in the distribution of occupations of two groups should belong to the human-capital component. This paper deals with the possibility that these differences may be due to discrimination and thus suggests examining the probabilities of belonging to certain occupations before making the decomposition. It is shown that this procedure improves the wage-differential decomposition by giving correct weight to the different components of the wage gap.

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Restricting Taxation: The Impact of Proposition 13 on California Tax and Expenditure Trends

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In response to citizen complaints that state and local taxes had been rising too rapidly for the services being provided, and that property taxes in particular had been steadily rising, California voters passed Proposition 13 by an almost two-thirds majority in 1978. This so-called "tax revolt" measure: rolled back property tax assessments to their 1975 level; restricted increases in assessments to 2% per year as long as the property does not change ownership or undergo substantial improvement; prohibited property taxes in excess of a property's full value; required a two-thirds majority of a jurisdiction's voters for local tax increases; and required a two-thirds majority of both houses of the state legislature for increases in state taxes. Ever since, whenever a government-related problem has arisen in California, from potholes to increased crime, its opponents have claimed that Proposition 13 caused it by gutting government revenue.

This paper examines trends in California taxes and expenditures at the state and local level. In particular, it considers whether Proposition 13, which has been blamed by politicians and the press for virtually every ensuing fiscal problem facing state and local governments in California, deserves such criticism, or whether the roots of those problems lie elsewhere.

State and Local Government Data

To judge the role of Proposition 13 on California's governments as a whole, we have collected data on state and local governments for fiscal years from 1966 to 1990. The basic background data include:

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the Consumer Price Index (to allow deflating current dollars to dollars of constant 1982-84 purchasing power); population (to allow both total and per capita measures); per capita personal income (to allow measures to be expressed in per-$1000-of-income terms); and the number of nonagricultural workers (to allow comparisons to be made in per-worker terms). In addition, we have collected state and local government fiscal data to make the desired tax and expenditure comparisons.

On the revenue side, the categories chosen for comparison (with N prefixes denoting that measures are in nominal, or current-dollar, terms) are: total general revenue per capita (NTGENREV); own source general revenue per capita (NOGENREV); all taxes per capita (NALLTAX); property taxes per capita (NPROPTAX); and charges and miscellaneous revenue per capita (NOTHREV). On the tax side, the categories chosen for comparison are: total direct general expenditures per capita (NTGENEXP); education expenditures per capita (NEDUC); public welfare expenditures per capita (NWELF); police expenditures per capita (NPOLICE); and fire expenditures per capita (NFIRE).

Comparisons in Real Per Capita Terms

Arguments have been made for making comparisons using taxes and expenditures in per-$1000-of-income terms or in real per worker terms. However, we have chosen real per capita data because it is most directly relevant to the primary question we are asking: Have tax revenues to the various levels of California government been so squeezed in the post-Proposition 13 era that those governmental institutions have been rendered unable to maintain their levels of service, requiring the gutting of those services or new expansions in taxes?

Per-$1000-of-income comparisons look at the question of whether the government consumes a larger share of total income than before, and per worker comparisons give us some insight into the costs imposed on those most likely to contribute substantially to income in the state. But neither directly addresses the question of whether the government has been forced to "cut back" its services substantially. However, real per capita data does address this question, as it adjusts for inflation and population growth. Even without any increase in government productivity, a government with a constant level of real

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Table A Inflation-adjusted Per Capita Fiscal Data for State Comparisons

STATE	YEAR	TGENREV	OGENREV	ALLTAX	PROPTAX	OTHREV	TGENEXP	EDUC	WELF	POLICE	FIRE
CA	66	1,932	1,562	1,281	667	281	2,009	747	259	71	34
CA	67	2,132	1,757	1,461	677	296	2,048	737	278	75	34
CA	68	2,284	1,894	1,552	716	342	2,233	793	336	83	40
CA	69	2,330	1,877	1,523	714	354	2,292	779	403	87	41
CA	70	2,363	1,905	1,554	763	351	2,361	796	443	95	44
CA	71	2,546	2,047	1,696	807	351	2,420	837	464	101	46
CA	72	2,727	2,141	1,768	833	373	2,447	847	450	110	48
CA	73	2,676	2,137	1,716	770	421	2,520	901	426	113	50
CA	74	2,669	2,172	1,763	757	410	2,558	925	383	114	51
CA	75	2,747	2,208	1,792	771	416	2,654	989	398	113	52
CA	76	2,916	2,320	1,914	805	406	2,612	981	417	114	52
CA	77	3,076	2,460	2,025	815	436	2,729	1,015	441	116	53
CA	78	2,670	2,115	1,623	408	492	2,532	879	413	110	50
CA	79	2,678	2,128	1,614	377	514	2,526	876	394	106	48
CA	80	2,644	2,074	1,529	370	545	2,549	869	422	109	48
CA	81	2,564	2,065	1,509	387	556	2,468	832	417	110	49
CA	82	2,345	1,903	1,385	360	517	2,298	750	369	105	46
CA	83	2,551	2,074	1,509	387	565	2,366	762	361	110	49
CA	84	2,693	2,191	1,583	404	607	2,498	813	363	115	50
CA	85	2,764	2,281	1,605	419	676	2,621	843	360	121	53
CA	86	2,936	2,461	1,757	452	703	2,790	891	372	132	70
CA	87	2,920	2,467	1,715	478	753	2,852	888	381	131	68
CA	88	3,028	2,552	1,764	459	788	2,838	921	395	121	53
CA	89	3,121	2,631	1,795	485	835	3,001	959	404	133	65
CA	90	3,098	2,585	1,783	500	802	3,107	991	448	139	61

Notes to Table AA.
Fiscal data are identical to that presented in Table A, but are measured in real (inflation-adjusted) dollars

TGENREV = Total general revenue, per capita
OGENREV = General revenue from own sources, per capita
ALLTAX = All taxes, per capita
PROPTAX = Property taxes, per capita
OTHREV = Charges and miscellaneous revenue, per capita
TGENEXP = Total direct general expenditures, per capita
EDUC = Education expenditures, per capita
WELF = Public welfare expenditures, per capita
POLICE = Police protection expenditures, per capita
FIRE = Fire protection expenditures, per capita

Primary source for fiscal data: Government Finances, (annual) U.S. Department of Commerce

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TABLE 6. Annual Rates of Change in Inflation-adjusted State-Local Revenues and Expenditures Per Capita and Related Measures in California

Rev/Exp Item	Pre-Prop13	Prop13	Post-Prop13
TGENREV	4.38056	-6.45486	1.44295
OSGENREV	4.28853	-6.70955	1.89329
ALLTAX	4.35249	-10.1865	1.04039
PROPTAX	1.92256	-28.7223	2.69177
OTHREV	4.22551	8.68389	4.26377
TGENEXP	2.85317	-3.73112	1.97779
EDUC	2.87621	-6.86071	1.23459
WELF	5.32531	-5.43815	1.31715
POLICE	4.59311	-4.17794	2.64366
FIRE	4.20155	-4.31177	3.16561
RGENREV	2.33420	-8.33856	0.12914
ROSREV	2.24668	-8.58184	0.56140
RATAX	2.32525	-11.9622	-0.28110
RPTAX	-0.02172	-29.9927	1.37790
ROTHREV	2.11278	6.37088	2.91105
RTOTEXP	0.85427	-5.70486	0.67052
REDUC	0.88895	-8.73789	-0.07291
RWELF	3.25720	-7.40260	0.11471
RPOLICE	2.57130	-6.17586	1.34940
RFIRE	2.18819	-6.30189	1.78312
PWGENREV	2.70135	-10.5292	1.42122
PWOSREV	2.59739	-10.7751	1.86230
PWATAX	2.67887	-14.1099	1.00466
PWPTAX	0.33862	-31.8851	2.66846
PWOTHREV	2.44985	3.99408	4.25179
PWTOTEXP	1.17962	-7.91170	1.96294
PWEDUC	1.22070	-10.9168	1.20280
PWWELF	3.63208	-9.53553	1.33418
PWPOLICE	2.92026	-8.32735	2.65728
PWFIRE	2.52338	-8.45715	3.16261

Notes for Tables A1-A8:

Measurement categories without a prefix are in real (inflation-adjusted) per capita terms; those with an R prefix are in per $1,000 of income terms; those with a PW prefix are un real (inflation-adjusted) per worker terms.

The Pre=Prop. 13 period covers F.Y. 1966-77.
Thre Prop. 13 period covers F.Y. 1977-79.
The Post-Prop. 13 period covers F.Y. 1979-90.

TGENREV = Total general revenue, per capita
OGENREV = General revenue from own sources, per capita
ALLTAX = All taxes, per capita
PROPTAX = Property taxes, per capita
OTHREV = Charges and miscellaneous revenue, per capita
TGENEXP = Total direct general expenditures, per capita
EDUC = Education expenditures, per capita
WELF = Public welfare expenditures, per capita
POLICE = Police protection expenditures, per capita
FIRE = Fire protection expenditures, per capita

Primary source for fiscal data: Government Finances, (annual) U.S. Department of Commerce

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per capita revenues and expenditures should be able to provide its constituents with a constant level of services. Further, this measure can give quite different results than the other ones cited. In a growing economy, the government can shrink as a percentage of total income (as reflected in per-$1000-of-income measures) and still grow substantially in real per capita terms. Therefore, while the data we have collected in Table A can be used to generate series in per-$1000-of-income or per worker terms as well, we have chosen to rely primarily on real per capita measures as the best way to investigate Proposition 13's effects on California's ability to deliver services to its citizens (although in Table B, the growth rate comparisons are done in per $1000 of income and per worker terms, as well as in real per capita terms).

California Revenue and Expenditure Trends

While there are almost any number of real per capita comparisons that can be made with the data in Table A, we single out the data for California. In terms of real (1982-1984 dollars) per capita data for combined state and local governments in California, several observations can be made:

1) Proposition 13 was a sharp turning point in state finances.

In keeping with the express intent of its supporters, 1978, the year Proposition 13 was passed, reversed a trend that had seen an explosion in real per capita general revenue from $1932 in 1966 to $3076 in 1977--an almost 60% increase, with similar results for own source general revenue (from $1562 to $2460) and all taxes (from $1281 to $2025). After Proposition 13 was enacted, 1978 real per capita general revenue was reduced $406 to about the 1974 level (from $3076 in 1977 back to $2670 in 1978, a drop of about 15%, which simply undid the revenue expansion since 1974), and then remained at roughly that level until the recession-induced dip began in 1981, and especially in 1982 (though, also, note that federal intergovernment aid fell 10% from 1977 to 1978 and 28.3% from 1977 to 1982).

2) The effects of the 1981-82 recession must be distinguished from those due to Proposition 13.

A substantial amount of the fall in real per capita general

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revenue between the passage of Proposition 13 and 1982, which its critics tend to attribute to it alone, is in fact due to the 1981-82 recession. Proposition 13 may be credited with lowering real per capita general revenue $406 (about 15%) from $3076 in 1977 to $2670 in 1978 (for the U.S. as a whole, there was virtually no change at all from 1977 to 1978, but there was a 10% cumulative reduction by 1982, indicating a national trend in this direction as well). But after that one-time drop, the figures for 1979 and 1980 remained virtually identical as those for 1978. However, the subsequent $299 reduction from $2644 in 1980 to $2345 in 1982 (which was roughly three quarters the size of the decrease from 1977 to 1978) was in fact attributable to the recession. For comparison, the U.S. average fell $112--almost 5%--from $2268 in 1980 to $2156 in 1982 (however, not only did California's real per capita revenue fall from a higher level, but California's revenue system tends to be more cyclical than most). Those who fail to distinguish these effects may bias their results, blaming Proposition 13 for what was in fact a sharp cyclical contraction in government revenues.

3) Real per capita revenue growth in California has been rapid since 1982.

Since the recession-induced general revenue dip that lasted until fiscal year 1982, or even since 1984, when real per capita general revenues had recovered to about their 1978-1980 level, they have rapidly expanded. They grew from $2345 in 1982 and $2693 in 1984 to $3121 in 1989 ($776--roughly 33%, and $428--roughly 16%, respectively), before falling slightly to $3098 in 1990. In addition, California's real per capita revenue growth since 1982 has outpaced that of the rest of the U.S. (which grew from $2156 in 1982 to $2755 in 1989--$599, or roughly 28%--and $2775 in 1990). Faster real state and local revenue growth per capita since 1982 than the U.S. average, which was itself growing substantially over that period, is hardly evidence of a government facing a revenue tourniquet.

4) Real state and local general revenues per capita have since exceeded their pre-Proposition 13 levels.

Despite the property tax reductions of Proposition 13 and the 1981-82 recession, real state and local general revenues per capita exceeded their 1977 levels in 1989. This reflects the fact that state

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and local government revenue has been growing back since it was "pruned" by Proposition 13, and has since exceeded the real per capita levels that first triggered the 1978 tax revolt.

5) Real charges and miscellaneous revenues per capita have risen sharply since Proposition 13.

For combined state and local governments, real per capita general revenue from own sources shows much the same pattern as does real per capita general revenue (although it exceeded its 1977 level sooner, beginning in 1986), despite the fact that real per capita taxes had not, as of 1990, grown beyond their pre-Proposition 13 peak (although by 1989, they had grown back to 1975 real per capita levels). This reflects the rapid growth in California's real per capita charges and miscellaneous revenue (from $436 in 1977 and $492 in 1978 to $835 in 1989, before a recession reduced $802 in 1990).

6) Real per capita property taxes plus charges and miscellaneous revenues exceeded their pre-Proposition 13 peak by 1989 (though the 1988 level was almost identical to 1977).

Real per capita property tax revenues have not exceeded their pre-Proposition 13 peak. But the reduced real per capita property tax revenues from 1977 to 1990 (from $815 to $500) have already been more than offset by increases in real per capita charges and miscellaneous revenue over the same period (from $436 to $802). Counting these two categories together, the 1990 real per capita state and local burden on Californians is now higher than it was before Proposition 13, and has been since 1989. Real per capita property taxes plus charges and miscellaneous revenues were reduced from $1251 in 1977 to $900 in 1978, then stayed below the 1977 level for several years, despite growth in charges and miscellaneous revenues; but since then the total had jumped to $1320 in 1989 before falling slightly to $1302 in 1990.

7) Real per capita state and local expenditure growth has been rapid since 1982.

Real state and local general expenditures per capita have followed the same general pattern as have revenues, although expenditures did not fall as much as revenues in the Proposition 13 implementation period ($197, from $2729 in 1977 to $2532 in 1978,

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with an even larger $251 fall from $2549 in 1980 to $2298 in 1982). They also recovered to the 1977 real per capita level in 1986 and grew rapidly from 1982 to 1990 (by $809, or roughly 37%) or from 1984 to 1990 (by $609, or roughly 26.5%).

8) Real per capita state and local government expenditures have not been gutted by Proposition 13.

Looking at the individual expenditure categories in real per capita terms, except for education (which fell from $1015 in 1977 to $879 in 1978, and had grown back to $991 in 1990), none of them lower than in 1977, although they were typically reduced for a time (but less than tax revenue) in the aftermath of Proposition 13. Further, as of 1990, state and local California governments spend substantially more in real per capita terms in every one of the categories measured than the national average, as they have almost continually over the entire post-Proposition 13 time period.

Real Per Capita Growth Rate Trends

Another way to look at state and local tax and expenditure trends before, during, and after Proposition 13 is to look at real per capita growth rates over those periods. In Table B each of the measurement categories are presented in terms of growth rates for the eleven year period, fiscal year 1966 to fiscal year 1977 pre-Proposition 13 period; the fiscal year 1977 to fiscal year 1979 Proposition 13 implementation period and the post-Proposition 13 period, fiscal year 1979 to fiscal year 1990.

The growth rates calculated allow a comparison of pre- and post-Proposition 13 growth trends, as well as reveal whether real per capita taxes and expenditures have been growing since Proposition 13 was implemented. While they do not show the growth of government since either 1982 or 1984 as clearly as Table A (since the post-Proposition 13 period includes the effects of the early 1980s recession), they clearly show the growth of state and local government revenues and expenditures since the implementation of Proposition 13.

Table B reveals three different data series for our three designated time periods: real per capita data (from TGENREV to FIRE); per-$1000-of-income data (from RGENREV to RFIRE); and real per worker data (from PWGENREV to PWFIRE). They highlight

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several conclusions:

1) Proposition 13 lowered but did not decimate government revenues.

Proposition 13's implementation led to large reductions in real per capita property taxes by all three measures--PROPTAX, RPTAX and PWPTAX (-28.72%, -29.99%, and -31.89%, respectively). While the effects on property taxes were quite dramatic, as one would imagine, the effects on overall taxes and expenditures in California were much smaller--too small, in fact, to be able to decimate the state's ability to finance services. Despite the sharp fall in real per capita property taxes, real general revenue per capita fell at a 6.45% annual rate over the two-year Proposition 13 implementation period (versus falling at a 1.38% annual rate for the U.S. as a whole), and real general expenditures per capita fell at a 3.73% annual rate over the same period.

2) Real per capita revenues and expenditures have risen since Proposition 13.

Since the Proposition 13 implementation period, every category of both real per capita revenues and expenditures has grown. However, the growth rates in the post-Proposition 13 period are generally much lower than they were in the pre-Proposition 13 period. For instance, the growth rate of real per capita revenues has gone from 4.38% before to 1.44% after Proposition 13 and the growth rate of real per capita expenditures has gone from 2.85% before to 1.98% after. The only exceptions to this are property taxes, whose real per capita growth rate rose from 1.92% before to 2.69% after (so that real per capita property taxes have been growing faster since the Proposition 13 implementation period in California than beforehand, as well as faster than in the U.S. as a whole, for which the growth rate has been 2.02%), and fees and miscellaneous revenues, which went from 4.22% before to 4.26% afterward (and jumped at a 8.68% annual rate during the Proposition 13 implementation period).

3) The growth rates of both real per capita revenues and expenditures have slowed since Proposition 13.

Although the levels of real per capita revenues and expenditures were growing after Proposition 13, the reduction in overall real per

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capita revenue and expenditure growth rates in California are striking. However, it does not appear that Proposition 13 is the primary cause (though the general "tax revolt" of this period, of which Proposition 13 was both a part and a catalyst, was a large part of it), because similar trends were at work in the U.S. as a whole. For the U.S., annual real per capita general revenue growth went from 4.84% before to 1.67% after (vs. 4.38% to 1.44% in California), and annual real per capita general expenditure growth went from 3.96% before to 2.07% after (vs. 2.85% to 1.98% in California). This implies that the slowed real per capita growth rates since the Proposition 13 implementation period cannot be used to scapegoat Proposition 13 as the cause of California's state and local government fiscal problems, as that same growth rate pattern is reflected throughout the country.

4) Growth rates in revenues and expenditures per-$1000-of-income show much the same results as in real per capita terms.

In terms of trends per-$1000-of-income (that is, in terms of whether state and local California governments have grown to command a larger share of income in the state, rather than just a greater real amount per person), the main difference from the data in real per capita terms is that the growth rates are lowered (shown in smaller positive numbers or larger negative numbers), reflecting incomes that rose faster than inflation over this period. The data shows smaller, but still positive, growth rates per-$1000-of-income since Proposition 13's implementation period than in real per capita terms for the major categories of total general revenues (0.13% vs. 1.44%) and total general expenditures (0.67% vs. 1.98%). But even in per-$1000-of-income terms, with their implicit assumption that the government should grow whenever incomes rise (because if government doesn't grow at the same pace as the economy, it will show up as a negative growth rate in per-$1000-of-income terms), the government has been growing, not shrinking, since Proposition 13 was implemented.

5) Growth rates in real per worker revenues and expenditures show much the same results as those in real per capita terms.

The growth rates stated in real per worker terms for California are lower in the Pre-Proposition 13 period than those stated in real

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per capita terms (reflecting a growing employment base in that period), but are almost exactly the same as in real per capita terms in the post-Proposition 13 period (reflecting a work force that has gone from a rising (pre 1978) to a stable (post 1979) proportion of the total population--though more recent anecdotal evidence suggests that the work force may now be falling as a proportion of total population in California). This means that virtually all that has been said of California real per capita trends since Proposition 13 also applies to real per worker measures.

Conclusions

Conclusions in the areas we have been considering must always be provisional, subject to newly available data. This is especially true for comparisons involving current situations, as the data is often released with such a lag that it is too late to use in current policy discussions. However, the data presented here strongly indicate that if we use real per capita data as the measure of the size of government (which seems valid for analyzing whether Proposition 13 has forced California government jurisdictions to curtail the real level of services rendered to their constituents), then Proposition 13 is a very poor candidate on which to blame current fiscal crises.

For California state and local governments as a whole, Proposition 13 did temporarily reverse the 1966-77 almost 60% increase in real per capita revenues and almost 36% increase in real per capita general expenditures. It cut real per capita general revenues roughly 15% from the 1977 level in 1978 and real per capita general expenditures roughly 7.2% from the 1977 level, reducing them approximately to their 1974 levels in 1978 through 1980. The ensuing recession then reduced these measures further from 1980 through 1982 (roughly 11% for real per capita general revenue and 10% for real per capita general expenditures). This appears to give the recession's effects a slightly smaller share of responsibility for any contemporary fiscal strains than can be assigned to Proposition 13, when measured in terms of general revenues; but a greater share of responsibility for such strains, measured in terms of general expenditures.

From the 1982 low points of state and local real per capita general revenues and expenditures, both measures have risen rapidly. Real per capita general revenues rose roughly 33% from 1982 to 1990, passing their 1977 pre-Proposition 13 peak in 1989 with the

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1990 figure falling back to roughly the same level as that of 1977. Real per capita general expenditures rose roughly 37% over the same time-period, passing its 1977 pre-Proposition 13 level in 1986 and exceeding it every year since, with the 1990 figure roughly 35% above its 1977 level. Using either measure, by the late 1980's state and local government in California had grown again to be larger than the level which inspired the 1978 tax revolt.

The above happened despite the fact that real per capita property taxes, at $500, had not risen back to their 1977 pre-Proposition 13 $815 peak by 1990. This reflects the fact that over the same period, real per capita charges and miscellaneous revenues (fees, assessments, and other nontax revenues) rose more (from $436 to $802) than real per capita property taxes fell, so that even ignoring other tax increases, these two categories combined impose a larger real per capita burden by 1989 (by 5.5%) than prior to Proposition 13.

Finally, not only is it true that while Proposition 13 lowered California state and local real per capita expenditures for a period, they were higher in 1990 than they were before Proposition 13; it is also true that by 1990, the levels of real per capita expenditures by state and local governments, welfare ($448 vs. $417), police ($139 vs. $113), and fire ($61 vs. $52) were once again greater than they were prior to Proposition 13. Only spending on education was lower ($991 versus $1015) than in 1977. Given these real per capita trends, Proposition 13 does not seem to merit its journalistic position as the universal scapegoat for every current fiscal problem in California.

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Rethinking the American Dream: Reactions of the Media to *The Bell Curve*

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The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life
by Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray
The Free Press, 1994

The Bell Curve is a serious work that deals with important subjects and that merits the attention it has received. Indeed, it challenges the entire structure of contemporary American social policy to the extent that this is based on multiculturalism, affirmative action and the concept of the liberal welfare society. Coming at a time when the vast Federal budget deficit – largely the product of welfare spending – has become a matter of national concern, it is not surprising that the book has sold hundreds of thousands of copies. Nor is it surprising that it has been under heavy attack in a media that has in recent decades fairly consistently favored multiculturalism, welfare spending and affirmative action designed to remove inequalities of income and influence among the diverse ethnic groups which constitute present-day America.

In *The Bell Curve,* the late Richard Herrnstein of Harvard University joins Charles Murray of the American Enterprise Institute in drawing attention to what they see as the "cognitive partitioning" of American society. They say that the more highly intelligent members of contemporary American society attend the top universities (80% of the highest IQ quartile now attend college, whereas only 55% of that quartile were able to attend college in 1950) and are becoming centered in a few occupations. By contrast, those of low intelligence are forming an underclass steeped in a variety of social pathologies. The authors believe that modern technology is placing increasing importance on intelligence in the workforce, and indicate that in a modern society there is less demand

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for those of lower intelligence, who in the past would have been fruitfully engaged in useful laboring activities.

This is even more significant, the authors hold, because intelligence is largely inherited, and costly social engineering schemes have failed to succeed in helping individuals of lower intelligence find a creative place in the modern world. Because the book is designed to emphasize this aspect of the problem of poverty, much of it is devoted to a review of scientific studies of intelligence, IQ tests, and of the bearing of genetics on cognitive ability. What has fired criticism the most, however, is that two chapters discuss the evidence for ethnic differences in intelligence. These present data that show that blacks on average perform significantly lower in IQ than whites and orientals. The authors observe that affirmative action has removed barriers that prevented higher-intelligence blacks from advancing in society, and that both blacks and whites of higher intelligence are moving into a meritocratic upperclass. This, they say, has left blacks of lower intelligence to stultify in welfare-based ghettos. To authors Herrnstein and Murray, affirmative action plans are no longer useful, since those who remain at the lower levels of society do not have the inborn intelligence to succeed in a meritocracy. They suggest that some form of benevolent conservative system of welfare is the only solution to this predicament.

This review will consist of two main parts: a critique of *The Bell Curve* by this author, followed by an extensive analysis of the media reaction to the book during the first four months following its appearance.

This Author's Critique

Because the book makes a number of valuable points, this reviewer sees it in a strongly positive light. It is at the same time however, an awkward book, made so by the marrying of two very different things: the detail of psychometric research and social commentary that, within the confines of a single book, is necessarily too limited to say all that it must. Some subjects, such as intelligence and the statistics that go into studying it, primarily reflecting the psychometric work of Richard Herrnstein, are discussed extensively. The vastness of this effort demands that other subjects, important to the analysis of the

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problems facing modern American society, are hardly discussed at all. "Cognitive partitioning," is used as a theme to tie the book together, but it is not in itself a sufficient explanation of all the social pathologies that afflict the United States. This "criticism" is largely overcome if we view the book as an effort to add certain elements to the debate without aspiring to be a comprehensive analysis.

To be specific, Herrnstein and Murray seek to demonstrate that low intelligence correlates with the population of an increasingly menacing, genetically-determined, underclass in the United States, and the book contains a series of chapters about specific social problems in which it is shown that each problem correlates with low intelligence. These chapters deliberately do not pertain to blacks, since the authors wanted to show that their analysis was not centered on the racial differences in IQ that they mention later. Regression analysis, the authors say, shows that intelligence is a cause of most, if not all, of these problems.

Without challenging the authors' emphasis on the importance of an appropriate level of intelligence to cope with the increasing sophistication of many job-related tasks as America moves into the future, what needs to be noticed is that such a correlation by itself is in no way the same thing as a full consideration of the causative factors that have since 1965 led many people of lower intelligence to act as they do. The overall level of IQ did not drop precipitously for any group within the United States during the half-decade between 1965 and 1970, but the level of behavior certainly did. The analysis of those other causative factors would require investigation into the ideology of "victimization," the impact of moral relativism, the disincentives of welfare, the pathologies of the "therapeutic state," the decline of the family and of true community – most, if not all, of which received serious attention in Murray's earlier work entitled *Losing Ground,* but which receive only passing mention here. The current book concentrates on the role of intelligence and on the degree to which intelligence is inherited and is hence largely immutable and unresponsive to the expensive environmental remedies attempted by government over the past three or four decades.

In American courts, juries are instructed that one thing is a cause of another if the second "would not have occurred *but for* the occurrence of the first." Applying this in the context of *The Bell*

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Curve, it is possible to say that the pathologies of the underclass would not exist if it were not for its members' lower intelligence. But this does not mean that there are not a number of other causal agents, such as those listed above, that *also* constitute "but-for causes." There is compelling reason to think that but for the ideological turn toward pathological behavior that the United States took in the mid-1960s, the members of American society with relatively low intelligence could for the most part still comport themselves as good citizens. Murray knows this, and so, presumably, did Herrnstein. It is understandable that they assigned themselves the more limited task of discussing intelligence and its relation to cognitive partitioning. A reviewer looking at the larger context will have reason to regret, though, that these other causal factors are, as a consequence, given little attention. To the extent these other causal factors are discussed, it is in the realm of moral philosophy, not of the empirico-mathematical science that the authors apply to intelligence.

The nature of the theme

Because experience has shown that book reviewers are sometimes lazy and don't even read the book they are reviewing, this reviewer wondered as he read *The Bell Curve* whether many commentators would separate themselves enough from the book's elaborate discussion of statistics and intelligence to even notice the overall theme. It has been a pleasant surprise that many have.

The theme points to the occurrence of an on-going "cognitive partitioning" in American society. Brought on by rapidly increasing technology, it is a process that separates a super-intelligent "cognitive elite" from the mass of ordinary people. These in turn are separated from a growing underclass that is drained of intelligence to the point of becoming a pathological "critical mass." The partitioning simultaneously threatens democracy with its growing class stratification and points ahead to an increasing assault on civilized life by members of the underclass.

These are important observations. They are, however, subject to two major criticism, which are that:

- A forebodingly stated suggestion that a cognitive elite may arise, centered in the professions and technical trades, when stated

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forebodingly, is not fully convincing. As Ernest van den Haag pointed out in a generally favorable article in *National Review*, there would be nothing necessarily exclusive about it; it does nothing to make impossible the success of countless other people, albeit somewhat less than geniuses, who can make fortunes in the many other pursuits of life and thereby come to belong, also, to the affluent "elite." The great wealth made by many ball players and entertainment personalities comes to mind, but a moment's reflection makes it clear that there are countless other possibilities for those who might be able to make up with character, energy and diverse talents for what they may lack in genius. The elite will be neither small nor exclusive. Herrnstein and Murray could, of course, respond that they are not claiming that their "cognitive elite" is to be regarded as identical to the affluent elite.

- The book is not fully persuasive, either, in its discussion of the "underclass." As we know from the United States' experience prior to the mid-1960s, there is nothing about low intelligence that condemns the less intelligent to less than a productive, civilized existence. True, it conduces to it in several ways, not the least of which is the foreshortened "time perspective" that Edward Banfield talked about a few years ago in *The Unheavenly City*. But a reversal of the other causative factors that have since the 1960s led to the emergence of a "menacing" underclass – alienated ideology, moral relativism, overweening paternalism, the decline of family, etc. – would make the situation far less apocalyptic and would take away much of the ill effects of "cognitive partitioning." Murray knows this himself, and so devotes attention to an alternative vision of society along neoconservative lines, favoring, as Irving Kristol has, a conservative welfare state (i.e., one whose redistributive programs reward acceptable rather than pathological behavior). The addition of IQ and "cognitive partitioning" to the equation has added a causal ground for pessimism, but one that is not nearly so controlling as the book's emphasis makes it seem. Murray's other writing is in many ways a better statement of the overall situation. The weakness of this over-emphasis on differences in intelligence has strengthened the hand of reviewers dedicated to the concept of biological egalitarianism. *The Bell Curve* has stimulated violent controversy, with many egalitarians resorting to open abuse and to the

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demonization of both the book and the researchers whose work on intelligence and heredity has been cited in it.

The Bell Curve is, indeed, the work of two very different authors (which has led to my analogy to the awkwardness of a camel). Herrnstein, who died of lung cancer in September 1994 just before the book was released, was an empirico-mathematical social scientist from Harvard in the area of psychometrics; Murray is a social philosopher and cultural commentator from the American Enterprise Institute. The result of their merger goes into great detail about the psychometric evaluation of intelligence, including even some excellent instruction to the reader on the basics of statistics. This reflects Herrnstein. It is all placed in a context of social philosophy, but without leaving enough space to elaborate on that complex topic sufficiently. That is Murray's part. One way to look at it is that Murray has performed a valuable service of providing a vehicle that brings the implications of Herrnstein's psychometrics to wide public attention. It has, in addition, achieved other valuable ends.

Upholding freedom of inquiry

A few of the commentaries on the book, written by those who feel ideologically compelled to deny the possibility that not all men are born biologically equal, have bordered on hysteria. As we will see in our later review here of the early literature, these have criticized the book as having the potential for reawakening what they portray as Nazi-like racism. Their point is valid enough as a reminder that "the price of liberty is eternal vigilance," but otherwise such fears, in the context of a work of serious research and thought, should be seen for what it is: a form of hyperbole that seeks to foreclose inquiry.

One of the most valuable contributions of *The Bell Curve* is that it runs counter to that taboo. By its very existence, it cries out for freedom of inquiry. The question is raised, as Nathan Glazer (to paraphrase him) did in *The New Republic*, "Why bring up these issues? They are better left unmentioned, unstudied; and to the extent they are not, society should impress a taboo upon them!" What is most important about this is that it raises again the issues that were once thought to have been settled when modern Western civilization came to embrace the outlook of the open society. It was just two hundred years ago that the delightful English

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conversationalist Samuel Johnson could argue that "every society has a right to preserve public peace and order, and therefore has a good right to prohibit the propagation of opinions which have a dangerous tendency ... No member of society has a right to teach any doctrine contrary to what that society holds to be true." No doubt there are a number of social cements that need to be preserved to maintain even a free society, but there is great value in holding fast to the faith that the inquiring mind is one of the principal pillars of freedom, both as a means and an end.

Implications for the United States' growing system of minority preferences

There are indications that a substantial number of Americans now sense that what is done in the name of "civil rights" has betrayed its initial moral premises and has become an ideological-political-opportunistic "con game." *The Bell Curve* strikes a blow to the myths that underlie this untoward extension. It is almost certainly this, far more than a genuine apprehension of any impending Nazism, that causes the greatest apprehension within the multiculturalist Left.

Prior to the civil rights movement that followed World War II, American society lived with a form of "cultural exceptionalism." White Americans generally believed quite sincerely in the principles of a free society, which include "equality under the law" and a willingness to judge each person on his merits. But during the Progressive movement around the turn of the century and for several years thereafter it was felt that historical circumstances, coming out of the existence of slavery and its aftermath, justified the compartmentalization that was reflected in the concept that was then known as "equal but separate."

As is known, this came under the most powerful moral attack during the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Blacks were no longer to be treated as an exception; it was imperative to make universal the principles of legal equality and individual merit. The consensus for those values was so strong that they seemed self-evident to most Americans, who went so far as to impose upon themselves a system of legislation commanding individuals in the great run of life's activities to judge people by their merits and not to make race any part of their criteria for decision. Fraternity was to be backed by the

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police power. The United States was to be a color-blind society.

It wasn't long, however, before liberal ideology swept the country past that. The issue of color-blindness became muddied by the presence of "de facto residuals" of the earlier social order. The desire to overcome those residuals suggested compensatory preferences, which themselves would suggest, once again, a form of "cultural exceptionalism." But the preferences didn't long retain their character as temporary expedients to return the United States to a truly color-blind society. Instead, the ideology, now confident of its power, came to embrace "multiculturalism" and the "benefits of diversity." The idea of color-blindness went out of fashion, except for whites for whom it remained obligatory, among the "politically correct"; now people are to be advanced *because* of their blackness, or their being female, or their ethnicity. It is this that amounts to a "con game," since it transfers the moral impetus from one thing to something else quite inconsistent with it and because it invokes a double standard, proscribing to whites, and especially to white males, what it encourages in others. It has led the United States into a double-track system of rights and privileges, leaving behind a unitary system of law and of Constitutional protections.

It is into this context that Herrnstein and Murray have come forth to splash a bucket of cold water onto the amorous coupling. Assuming they are right – and it takes an expert in social science methodology, which this reviewer is not, to judge that –, what they point out is shattering:

- That the distribution of intelligence among blacks – in a bell-shaped curve that is offset somewhat to the left of that of the society at large – is not such as to make available large numbers of persons who are intellectually capable of success within the cognitive professions. There are many very intelligent blacks, but their percentage at the higher scale of intelligence falls significantly short of matching the percentage of blacks in the population as a whole. What this means, say, is that if universities and government departments adopt a policy, as many are, of hiring almost all minorities until a certain social reconstruction is achieved, they will be competing for the same small pool of qualified individuals. This will force them to lower their standards, will cause millions of people to look with doubt

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upon the achievements of any given black, and will cause resentment among those who, though better qualified, are displaced. The idea that such racial preference can be indulged without adverse consequences depends upon the faith in equal intelligence, and that is precisely what Herrnstein and Murray are puncturing.

- That blacks in the United States are already equal, and sometimes over-represented, in high-level positions – and in education, occupations and wages – relative to what would be predictable if intelligence were the criterion. The revolutionary impact of this is that it contradicts the myth of continuing "victimization" (a new word for the old Marxist concept of "exploitation.") The idea that a vicious mainstream society is victimizing minorities is the glue that holds together the ideological alliance of the Left's alienated intellectual culture with the groups that, the intelligentsia hopes, will long relish being disaffected and unassimilated.

Dysgenic trends

Three genetic forces, the authors say, are at work to lower the level of intelligence in the United States: a higher birthrate within the less intelligent underclass, a postponement of child-bearing for several years by more intelligent women, and the nature of recent immigration, which has been from the Third World. The first two of these forces are at work not just within the society at large, but also within the black community, leading to a worsening of prospects for blacks within a civilization that is increasingly rewarding intelligence. This is a matter that might well be of constructive concern to blacks themselves.

Of course, a discussion of anything genetic is taboo, since an investigation of dysgenics automatically conjures up images of Hitler's abuse of eugenics. The facts are important, however; they certainly call, as the authors do, for at least so much as a repeal of the policies that presently favor more babies by low-income women. The issue isn't whether the United States should impose a draconian eugenics, but whether it should stop doing things to encourage dysgenics.

A call for a more humane social order

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It may seem incongruous to mention it in light of the cries that have been raised that the book, by comparing the intelligence of races, is proto-racist, but time should be taken to notice that Herrnstein and Murray sketch the outlines of what could be a much more humane society. Understandably, they see few profound human satisfactions in the crumbling, warring inner cities fostered by the custodial, therapeutic state. They offer the alternative of a truly free society, in which people at all levels find sustenance, warmth and "a valued place" through the local, interpersonal processes that multiply so profusely within humanity when government and ideology don't get in people's way.

Two criticisms of this vision are to be made by those who take a conservative perspective. First, such persons will be inclined to argue that the proposition that "some sort of redistribution is here to stay" should, at the very least, be debated. There will likely be a vigorous discussion on the Right about whether the "conservative welfare state" favored by Murray and Herrnstein is in fact a minimal necessity. This especially means identifying and scrutinizing its specific components, comparing them, as libertarians and classical liberals are so wont to do, with voluntaristic and local alternatives.

Second, Herrnstein and Murray say that the United States must "return to the melting pot as metaphor and color blindness as the ideal." Many people are beginning to argue that it is rapidly becoming too late for the American people, if they care about their identity, simply to endorse a melting pot without qualification. They have for thirty years been flooded with immigration of non-European origin. Americans saw the melting pot as a splendid ideal when the newcomers would melt into a high Euro-American civilization. A reverse process whereby Euro-American civilization melts into that of the Third World is, to those of conservative bent, another matter entirely. The latter is what will happen unless Americans quickly form and enforce a consensus to limit immigration. Murray and Herrnstein express concern about the current immigration because of its dysgenic effects. In terms of American identity, the concern will need to go further and center on the long-term continuity of the United States culturally and politically. But this is hardly a criticism of Herrnstein and Murray; it is too much to expect them to have carried the dialogue that far. The issues they undertook to study are

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more than enough for any two thinkers, however courageous.

No book in this reviewer's memory has done so much to provoke so stimulating and widespread a discussion. If there were a Nobel Prize for Freedom of Inquiry, Herrnstein and Murray would be among the leading candidates.

Media Reaction to *The Bell Curve*

The Bell Curve has proved one of the most provocative writings of recent times. It would seem that within weeks of its publication in October 1994, virtually everyone involved in social commentary in the United States had something to say about it.

Since it is doubtful whether many who are interested in the book will have had the time or the sources available to read more than a part of that early literature, the *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* has benefitted from a clipping service which provided the initial commentaries that appeared in late 1994 and early 1995 so that this article can report on them. This survey is based on approximately 125 book reviews, columns, articles and television commentaries that appeared in the American media (plus a small number from England and Canada) during that period.

The media's treatment of earlier writings in similar areas was discussed in Stanley Rothman and Mark Snyderman's book *The IQ Controversy: The Media and Public Policy* (Transaction Books, 1988) and in Roger Pearson's *Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe* (Scott-Townsend Publishers, 1991). Pearson is editor of *Mankind Quarterly*.

As the above critique suggests, this literature is significant for two reasons: because the issues raised by *The Bell Curve* (and others), and the debate over them, are important; and because the very publication of the book in violation of the demands of "political correctness" in the United States in the 1990s raises vitally significant issues of freedom of speech and of inquiry. The demands for suppression of the book were well illustrated in February 1995 when mass protests occurred at Rutgers University in New Jersey after it became known that the university president, who had an long record of promoting affirmative action, had made a comment to the faculty senate three months earlier about "genetic, hereditary background" being a cause of the low average scores of Rutgers' black students on

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the Scholastic Aptitude Test.

A warning may be in order. Although the remainder of this article is a report on the literature rather than an evaluation, even a simple review of it involves characterizing and classifying the commentaries. This requires judgments about nuance and degree. To help assure being fair to each author, we began by reading each commentary with careful attention to the integrity of its author's view taken as a whole. The reader would need to study the sources himself to see whether we have succeeded in that effort.

The Tone of the Reaction: Favorable and Unfavorable. Although it has sometimes been said that *The Bell Curve* was greeted with a firestorm of denunciation, that description is by no means entirely correct. The reaction during the first three months covered the entire spectrum of possible opinion, with ample representation at almost every point along it. There were a number of favorable commentaries, including a favorable review in the *New York Review of Books,* and these can be placed along a continuum that ranges from "uncritically supportive" to "tentatively sympathetic"; some commentaries staked out neutral ground; and yet another continuum applies to those that were unfavorable, ranging from "unfavorable, but reasoned" to "purely vituperative." Perhaps because we expected a large number of denunciatory pieces and so took them for granted, we are impressed by the volume of reasoned discussion, both favorable and unfavorable. There is considerable civility within much of it, resulting in an impression that a genuine national debate is occurring within an important segment of the educated public. At the same time, significant voices urge shrouding such issues in silence or intimidating those who dare to speak on them.

Favorable Reactions

Uncritically supportive

Because it limits itself to paraphrasing *The Bell Curve*, one review that can arguably be called "uncritically supportive" is a column by psychology professor Richard Lynn, which appeared in the *London Times*.[1] Lynn was one of the sources most frequently cited in the book, and it was only to be expected that he would report favorably,

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although he demonstrated his fairness by restricting his comments primarily to informing the *Times*' readers of the book's content rather than to evaluating it.

Supportive through a weighted presentation

In this survey, it will be interesting to note the argumentative techniques used by different writers. A favorable article by Peter Brimelow in *Forbes*[2] adopts a technique that is to be expected from those who are sympathetic to the authors' position. He recounts a series of arguments against the book and follows each with a Herrnstein-Murray rebuttal to give it the final say.

Supportive, with a reasoned basis

Several favorable critics make their discussion a reasoned consideration of one or more issues. This would not be surprising in most contexts, but here they are taking up issues that part of the intellectual culture insists be off-limits. In a brief column, Kevin Lamb, an assistant librarian for *Newsweek*, discusses the nature of psychometry as science, speaks of the *ad hominem* attacks on Herrnstein and Murray, and explores such issues as the measurability of intelligence, its heritability and intractability, and the factors that, in addition to intelligence, cause success.[3] In the *New York Times Book Review*, Malcolm Browne, also supportive, makes a reasoned discussion of eugenics, suggesting that "sooner or later, society may have to decide whether human beings have the right – perhaps even the duty – to strengthen our species' cognitive defenses ...."[4] Daniel Seligman in *National Review* tells of the growing body of knowledge about the genetic role in human behavior. He cites increasing assertions by scientists that such a trait as homosexuality is biologically determined, but warns that genes create probabilities rather than determined outcomes.[5]

In an article published in London, Hans Eysenck, one of today's most prominent empirical psychologists, reviews at length the scientific consensus supporting Herrnstein's view of the heritability of intelligence among "the great majority of experts – psychologists, behavioral geneticists and educationalists."[6] Columnist D. J. Tice in St. Paul, Minnesota, observes that the Herrnstein-Murray thesis "offends the essential hubris and egalitarianism of the modern world

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view" and calls for a redirection of social policy away from "the kind of help liberal society prefers to give" (to the less intelligent).[7] Christopher Caldwell in *The American Spectator* demonstrates a knowledge of the current literature beyond *The Bell Curve* and gives an excellent and detailed summary of Herrnstein and Murray's main points, accompanying each with intelligent reflection.[8] Michael Barone, a senior writer for *U. S. News & World Report*, was the author of the first commentary in the *National Review*'s December 5, 1994, symposium. He focuses on how the demonstration of genetic inequalities undercuts the rationale first for the ideology of "victimization" and then for the "rotten" "regimes of [reverse] racial preference" that have been developed on behalf of minorities in the United States in recent years.[9]

Not unsupportive, but with criticisms

Other favorable authors include some points of disagreement within a reasoned analysis. Conservative columnist Patrick J. Buchanan says that intelligence is important but that other traits such as character and courage are also keys to success.[10] Michael Novak seconds this with the "wish [that] somebody would write a companion study, as scholarly as theirs, concentrating on issues of character rather than on issues of intelligence."[11] Charles Krauthammer in the *Washington Post* is favorable to Herrnstein and Murray's warning about an emerging underclass, noting that "for the last two decades it is the very liberals who so vehemently denounce Murray who have been obsessed with race," but says that he opposes any form of multiculturalism, even a conservative one such as he sees *The Bell Curve* suggesting, because he prefers the ideal of a color-blind society. He disagrees with Herrnstein's thesis that group differences in intelligence are rooted in genes, and adheres to the belief that environment and culture determine intelligence, since the differences change over time.[12] Economist Thomas Sowell, a black and a supporter of the free market, is favorable and respectful, but is persuaded by the "Flynn effect" (the belief that IQ is generally rising with each generation) that the role of genetics is questionable. The "Flynn effect" also suggests to Sowell there is no threat of a dysgenic trend. He supports Herrnstein and Murray against the charge that IQ tests are "culturally relative" by observing that people *do* live

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within particular cultures.[13]

Two of the otherwise seemingly favorable authors take issue with *The Bell Curve*'s projections regarding the emergence of a genetically-determined cognitive partitioning. William F. Buckley refers to Malthus and Marx and then says that "one more grand social schema" can only provoke a smile.[14] *Washington Times* columnist Richard Grenier points to the continuing importance of character, judgment and common sense, and concludes that "personally, I don't think this apocalyptic vision will ever come to pass."[15]

Tentatively sympathetic

The issues are so controversial that some authors treat them with obvious diffidence. Elise Houlik interviewed Professor Robert Gordon, who is one of the sources cited in *The Bell Curve*, for an in-house magazine at The Johns Hopkins University where Gordon is employed, reporting that "I prepared myself to meet an absolute ogre ... Instead, I found a normal, unassuming man with a strong commitment to his research."[16] Book reviewer Mel Small for the *Detroit News-Free Press* is temperate and friendly, but shies clear of expressing agreement.[17]

Neutral Reactions

Some of the commentators express neither agreement nor disagreement, simply trying to report the various sides of the argument. Nina J. Easton's article in the *Los Angeles Times* is balanced, although the "pull-quotes" that highlight the piece are negative. An odd thing about her article is that she uses emotive words against both sides, apparently reflecting a reportorial style of assumed cynicism rather than a bias against either side.[18] A fair-minded discussion from both points of view is written for *The Chronicle of Higher Education* by Ellen K. Coughlin.[19] Sometimes a humorous approach is taken, as in columnist Gil Spencer's light-hearted report on *The Bell Curve*'s cognitive-partitioning thesis.[20] Writing about the book in the *Boston Globe* before its appearance, Anthony Flint made a balanced discussion of both sides of the heritability debate.[21] Robert S. Boyd of the *Wichita Eagle*'s Washington Bureau gives a balanced, factual review of the history of

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recent genetic studies, and reviews the points of difference.[22] Four commentaries talk about the issues for their own sake without expressing an overall reaction to the book, or else with only an incidental reaction. Michael Young and Brigitte Burger in the *National Review* symposium, and Alexander Star and Martin Peretz in *The New Republic*'s symposium, which was generally unfavorable, are of this sort.[23]

Also standing between the favorable and unfavorable pieces are various mixed commentaries. James Powell's article in *Insight* is favorable, mainly reporting the views contained in the book, except that the headline ("New Ideas About Smarts Stand Logic on its Head") is negative, possibly having been assigned to Powell's work by an unsympathetic editor.[24] Peter Passell's book review in the *New York Times* treats the book with considerable respect, but is unfavorable toward the book's policy suggestions.[25]

Unfavorable Reactions

Unfavorable and "politically correct," but without demonizing Herrnstein and Murray

Later, we will see a number of strongly unfavorable commentaries that are purely vituperative. Many of the critics seem determined to warn other academics against publicly supporting Murray and Herrnstein's thesis by demonizing the two authors. However, a number that are unfavorable present their case with reason and civility (although civility should not be seen as precluding a vigoruous articulation). Richard Nisbett in *The New Republic*'s symposium gives Herrnstein and Murray credit for dealing with "extraordinarily important issues," but argues that the book contains "three assertions ... about race and I.Q. that do not reflect the consensus of scholars," citing the genetic basis for group differences, the intractability of IQ, and the belief that group differences in IQ are not significantly reducible.[26] In one of the better rebuttals, Ann Hulbert in the same symposium goes deeply into the substantive issues, attacking the empirical analysis, citing the Flynn effect, pointing to what she sees as inconsistencies, and taking issue with the book's policy prescriptions.[27] E. D. Hirsch, Jr.'s, column in the *New York Times* makes a civil discussion that contains no personal attack

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on the authors or their sources, but that disagrees with Herrnstein and Murray on the evidence for racial differences in intelligence, citing counter-examples from situations where excellent education is available.[28] Columnist George Melloan in the *Wall Street Journal* uses emotive words to debunk *The Bell Curve* but raises points from both sides.[29]

Other commentaries that can plausibly be placed in the same category are those by B. A. Wilson, Kathryn Markel and Eric Oddleifson in the letters-to-the-editor section of the *Wall Street Journal*, all on October 28. Wilson attacks the idea that an elite is becoming isolated, especially when compared to what is called "the old 'legacy' elite." Markel cites a recent study that causes her to opt for more, not less, social intervention. Eric Oddleifson argues the case for multiple intelligence and the consequent insufficiency of a simple IQ score.[30] Columnist Peter Shrag in the *Baltimore Sun* goes so far as to deny that the study of race and intelligence is "science," but observes that the study of those subjects feeds off of the Left's own racial categorizing.[31] John Leo, in a column in the *U. S. News & World Report*, is unfavorable on the ground that *The Bell Curve* "is a very unhelpful book," providing no answers beyond "pessimism and negative group labeling."[32] In an article in the same issue of that journal, William F. Allman covers the gamut of issues from a critical perspective but without demonizing Herrnstein and Murray.[33]

Scott McConnell is reasoned in a *New York Post* column despite using some emotive language.[34] A report in London's *The Economist* by an unnamed author accuses the book as being political and opportunist, but stays on a reasoned track despite its negative impressions.[35] A news article quoting Jack Kemp, a Republican presidential aspirant in past years, indicates that he is unfavorable, since he considers the ideas unpalatable and the book "pseudo-scientific"; but he balances this with a reference to Murray as "a man of honor and integrity."[36]

Four additional commentators round out the list in this category. They are columnists Doug Hufnagel in the *Camden Herald*, Don Munsch in the *Denison* (Texas) *Herald*, Sheldon Smith in the *Milwaukee Journal*, and book reviewer Mary Meehan in the *National Catholic Register*.[37]

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Unfavorable, and cleverly ad hominem

Frank Rich in his column in the *New York Times* is thoroughly critical, but turns a neat phrase, as when he writes of *The Bell Curve*'s having "enough equivocating for another 'Hamlet,'" or speaks of the book's "air of unimpeachable authority, much as all those radar maps impart meteorological gravity to Willard Scott."[38] Josh Ozersky at Notre Dame and St. Mary's College uses sardonic humor, presenting his column in the form of a tongue-in-check battery of IQ test questions.[39]

Unfavorable without significant argument
but falling short of demonizing

Barbara Vobejda's article in the *Washington Post* paints an unfavorable picture without giving much content by surveying the commentaries prior to late October and citing studies contrary to the Herrnstein-Murray position, saying that the latter "brush them off."[40] A book review by an unnamed author in the *San Antonio Register* says most social scientists disagree with the view that genes are important to racial differences in IQ, but gives little of its own reasoning.[41] A column by Joyce Evans in the *Milwaukee Sentinel* is content simply to say that Herrnstein and Murray's ideas are "unproved."[42]

Unfavorable, with heavily weighted presentation,
but still short of demonizing

To say that a piece stays "short of demonizing" is to make a judgment about it that may or may not seem justified to others reading the commentary. The reviews that are examined later that seek to "demonize" Herrnstein and Murray seem a form of attempted suppression, since a probable motive for extremely abusive commentary is to punish the current authors and to "chill" the desire of future researchers to extend the inquiry. Accordingly, we are not anxious to classify a commentary into that category if there is any way to credit it as simply being within the rough give-and-take that all authors dealing with sensitive public issues must expect.

Debra Viadero in *Education Week* makes several substantive points about IQ, quoting from scholars whose views are contrary to those of Herrnstein and Murray, in an effort to create the impression that *The Bell Curve* is poorly founded.[43] The same weighted

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technique is invoked by Anita Manning in *U.S.A. Today*.[44] She quotes a dean at Temple University to make a point that is essentially anti-intellectual, since it does not accept inquiry on its merits: "I have to ask why this issue is so enduring. Why is it comforting ....?" In *Time* magazine, Richard Lacayo weights his discussion by giving center stage to three selected social scientists, each of whom take a critical view of the book.[45] Jim Holt's op-ed column in the *New York Times* combines reasoned argument about discoveries in the "hard science" of genetics with a heavy use of highly emotive terms to cast a strongly negative pall: "psychometry ... has a long and farcical history ... irrational convictions ... manure of pseudoscience and quackery."[46] David Stipp's book review in the *Wall Street Journal* and a bylined news article by John Boudreau in California are unfavorably weighted by giving most of the say to opponents.[47]

The fringe of pure vituperation is approached by seven pieces that are highly unfavorable and whose argument seems, at least to this author who is not an expert in the study of intelligence, as outside the "reasoned" range. Readers will want to examine these to see whether they agree. In the *New York Times* "Editorial Notebook," Brent Staples recites a history of putatively stupid, biased IQ testing on Ellis Island, during World War I, and in the 1920s. As to the heritability of intelligence, he brushes it off as "a long-unproved claim" and as supported by "no plausible data."[48] In *The New Republic*'s symposium, Dante Ramos does not trouble to examine the evidence, but simply writes off the finding that the average IQ of African blacks is 75 as "ridiculous."[49] Neither does Stanley Crouch in the same symposium consider the merits, simply ascribing extraneous motives to the authors.[50] Leon Wieseltier, who writes the longest of that symposium's commentaries, is highly emotive and vituperative, taking up a number of issues in a personal and ad hominem fashion, and starting with the assumption that Herrnstein and Murray are wrong.[51] Jason DeParle uses a chatty feature-story format for much of his article in the *New York Times Magazine*.[52] There is considerable emotive coloring, creating an unfavorable image of Charles Murray, and a theme of amateur psychoanalyzing (which, though mainly negative, ends with a certain empathy). He gets into the issues on the merits in the final part of the article. Columnist Linda J. Collier in the *Philadelphia Tribune* bases her piece on straw

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men by two important misstatements of Herrnstein and Murray's positions.[53] She speaks of their "theory that whites are superior and that everyone else falls behind them" [overlooking the high IQs accorded by the authors to several hundred million Asians], and she asks "how come they assume that by looking at my face they can tell my intellectual capacity with reasonable accuracy and precision?" [ignoring Herrnstein and Murray's emphatic statement that nothing can be said about an individual because of statistics relating to a group]. Robert N. Taylor in Kansas City is emotively unfavorable without giving *The Bell Curve*'s research a fair consideration.[54]

Very unfavorable: opposing scientific inquiry into race and intelligence, or seeking to repress such research by demonizing it

A sizeable number of commentaries are purely vituperative. Instead of reviewing them at this point, we will detail them in the discussion (which follows) of the demand that research into such areas as behavioral genetics, comparative intelligence, and eugenics should be suppressed, since they seem calculated to place all such research "beyond the pale."

Taboo Versus Freedom of Inquiry

Early in the twentieth century it was openly accepted in the United States and Europe to study – and even to base social policy upon findings relating to – race, intelligence and eugenics. This was displaced, however, by three developments: first, the disrepute attached to National Socialist policies in respect a eugenics and race; second, the ideological view taken by Stalinist Marxism which banned Mendelian genetics in favor of the belief that human beings are wholly malleable and the product of their environment; and, third, the ideological imperatives that arose in the United States in the decades after World War II out of the Civil Rights movement, and of the accompanying moral consensus, on behalf of blacks. A strong taboo against the subjects of race and heredity resulted, except that work continued in the scientific community, being drawn to occasional public attention by the media when new findings resulted in eruptions of militant protest.

Scott McConnell in the *New York Post* points out that this taboo was intact in 1992 when former *Fortune* editor Daniel Seligman

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authored "a judicious and highly readable book on IQ testing ... [which] devoted a chapter to race and IQ, and came to conclusions similar to those of Murray and Herrnstein." McConnell observes that the taboo was sufficiently powerful to ensure that "this book was left unreviewed by the mainstream media, and sank with barely a ripple. The taboos in this realm were still in force." Asking what has caused the taboo to break down – and this is perhaps the most significant thing about the widespread reaction to *The Bell Curve* – McConnell points out that "it's hard not to notice how virtually every aspect of social policy in America has been soaked with race talk – and that it has not been white conservatives who have been leading the way."[55]

In this context, part of the reaction to *The Bell Curve* consists of an attempt by several authors to invoke the taboo and to seek to punish Herrnstein and Murray and any others who now or in the future may discuss such issues. Another part consists of a direct discussion of whether there *ought* to be a taboo on the subject of race, heredity and intelligence, as against freedom of inquiry. We will survey both of these reactions.

Reportorial review of the opinions

Rod Dreher in the *Washington Times* gives a brief summary of the views of William J. Bennett, Jesse Jackson, James Q. Wilson, Camille Paglia, Richard John Neuhaus, Michael Cromartie and Stanley Crouch about whether the book should have been published.[56] Bennett, Wilson, Paglia and Crouch are quoted as favoring open discussion; Jackson and Neuhaus as not; and Cromartie as thinking the publication unwise on Herrnstein and Murray's part.

Expressing opposition to free inquiry

A news article by Howard Kurtz in the *Washington Post* tells about the rebellion that occurred within the editorial staff of *The New Republic* when the editor, Andrew Sullivan, decided to publish a synopsis written by Herrnstein and Murray.[57] The rebellion led to the publication of the symposium, mostly negative, that accompanied the synopsis, and in turn the symposium included an airing of some of the participants' desire to continue the taboo. Glenn Loury's piece asks why it is essential, as Herrnstein and Murray assert, "for people to begin to talk openly." His arguments are prudential, centering on the

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subject's "destructive" effects in the absence of "useful action," and as such is a radical break from the *a priori* "free speech as an absolute good" concept long endorsed by many on the American Left. Neo-conservative Nathan Glazer's comments are along similar lines, inquiring "to what end?" the subject should be discussed. "What good will come of it?" His final sentence is breath-taking in the American context: "I ask myself whether the untruth is not better for American society than the truth." Black author Hugh Pearson says Herrnstein and Murray should themselves have seen the destructiveness of their inquiry and have held back from it.[58]

The authors in *National Review*'s symposium are, as we will see, much more open to discussion. Nevertheless, Richard John Neuhaus among them writes of the "questioning of taboos" as "intellectual mischief" and says that "society depends upon taboos and interdictions ... Why was it so necessary to speak this truth, if it is truth, about racial differences in cognitive functioning?" He runs directly counter to John Stuart Mill's argument in *On Liberty* that an open marketplace of ideas leads to a better appreciation of truth: "There is an astonishing naivete in the suggestion that we should have a nice, polite national conversation about the alleged cognitive inferiority of blacks."[59]

Outside the symposia, John Sedgwick's long piece in *GQ* is mainly an exercise in emotive denunciations and *ad hominem* attacks, but does at one point directly discuss the matter of a taboo, doing so in connection with Philippe Rushton's work: "'Think of an equivalent topic for scientific inquiry, like "Are Jews Pushy?"' said Nicholas Lemann, author of *The Promised Land* ... 'Is this an issue that should be put out on the table?' Race relations are so fragile that it is impossible to discuss them without immense tact ...."[60] Jason DeParle in the *New York Times Magazine* quotes sociologist Christopher Jencks as saying that there is a "striking dearth of evidence" about how physical brain processes differ by race and that "this seems to me a case where you ought to have really airtight evidence before you make claims."[61]

Opposition to publication on the ground that the book is in error

Jencks' point edges close to the position taken by some commentators that the Herrnstein-Murray position is flawed and

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should not have been published for that reason. Eugene D. Genovese in the *National Review* symposium argues that the book is "incoherent" because Herrnstein and Murray "begin by rejecting 'race' as a category that will not stand scientific analysis," but then use it anyway. "Exactly what, we may ask, is the subject of this discussion?"[62] Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's review in the *Washington Post* is a fair-minded discussion, but cites a "profound schizophrenia" within the book about the isolation of the cognitive elite, since Herrnstein and Murray "bemoan the segregation of IQ among the elite" but then "complain that businesses cannot use IQ as a selection device." He speaks of the "moral dilemma" over publication and asks "which principle should take precedence in this case?," to which he answers "I must confess, I am still confused."[63] The tone taken by columnist Sally Steenland for the Knight-Ridder newspapers is very different, since she accords Herrnstein and Murray no respect, calling them "glib" and "not very smart," but she nevertheless cites reasons from her experience as a teacher for thinking that "standardized IQ tests did not begin to capture [the students'] native intelligence."[64]

Condemnation and suppression of the subject by demonization

Several commentaries, while citing all sorts of reasons for their position, are so vituperative and give so little respect to Herrnstein and Murray as engaged in legitimate inquiry that they are best categorized as attempts to suppress thought and discussion in the subjects covered by the book. Authors in controversial areas must be prepared for considerable abuse as part of a vigorous debate, which they can't always expect to be conducted with courtesy; but abuse beyond a certain point is arguably an effort to coerce and to silence. Just where that point is crossed is a matter of judgment.

Here are a few of such commentators' denunciations, necessarily abstracted from the various contexts raised by their pieces:

- Jacob Weisberg in *New York*: "... about as toxic as social science gets ... grist for racism of every variety. You can hear a thousand David Dukes in the background ...."[65]
- Jerry Rosen and Charles Lane in *The New Republic*'s symposium: "Neo-Nazis! ... chilly synthesis ... eccentric race theorists and eugenicists ... racialist notion ... shabbiness of the tradition ...."[66]
- Alan Wolfe in *The New Republic*'s symposium: "... obsessed by

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race ... if they said what they meant, their ideas would come across as not only racist, but also nutty ... inegalitarian, ungenerous and reactionary ... the nasty side ...."[67]

- John B. Judis in *The New Republic*'s symposium: "... not based on science, but on a combination of bigotry and metaphysics ... pseudo-scientific racism."[68]
- Editorial in *New York Times*: "... flame-throwing treatise ... political ideologue ... long and sordid history ... bigots ... aura of scientific certitude ... Though [it] contains serious scholarship, it is also laced with tendentious interpretation ... chilling conclusions ... an act of advocacy."[69]
- Dorothy Gilliam in the *Washington Post*: "... the type of racist drivel Murray, Herrnstein, et al., put forth as science ... not accord it the dignity given to honest thought."[70]
- James Ridgeway in *The Village Voice*: The cover illustration shows a monster-like Charles Murray eating the head of a black on a plate and carries the heading "Racism Gets Respectable." The article's language: "... racialist ideas ... attack on American democracy ... scientific racism ... greed, in the name of excellence ...."[71]
- Columnist Carl Rowan: "... orgy ... arrogant 'social scientist' ... bogus science ... drones on and on ... pseudo-scientists ... have written an excuse for the white majority ... Adolf Hitler's anti-Semitism ... The Murray-Herrnstein book is just another curse ...."[72]
- Rev. Jesse Jackson, president of National Rainbow Coalition: "It is an attempt to give intellectual standing and political footing to conservative public policies and social programs of repression and/or neglect ... All such superior and inferior theories are garbage! ... pseudo-scientific theories."[73]

Other commentaries that this author would classify in this category are listed in the footnote.[74]

Some of the articles, joined by one national television broadcast, make their attack in the form of elaborate investigative or historical accounts of what they consider the "sordid" researchers cited in *The Bell Curve*, as well as upon a New York Foundation which funded some of the research cited in the book, as well as a 35 year old anthropology journal, *The Mankind Quarterly*, in which many of the researchers cited by the authors had published.[75] Those attacks, profoundly *ad hominem*, need to be considered on their merits and

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are beyond the scope of this report.

Commentators who assert the rights of inquiry and discussion

In opposition to the reactions just discussed, a few authors took their stand in favor of free research and discussion.

Those who spoke up against the "demonization" of inquiry into the significance of heredity and race differences include Samuel Francis, Thomas Sowell and Daniel Seligman. Referring to "smears and outright personal attacks," Francis says that "what is striking about the 'discussion' is its utter banality and fundamental viciousness ...."[76] Sowell observes that "what we are seeing now is the beginning of a campaign for the moral extermination of Charles Murray ...."[77] Seligman writes: "It is clear enough what *The Bell Curve*'s liberal critics want. They want its ideas suppressed. They want the data to go away. They want the authors depicted as kooks and extremists."[78]

One of the strongest voices for open inquiry is Ed Koch, former mayor of New York City. Speaking of the attempts to silence conservatives on "talk radio," he says that "these efforts to intimidate ... are outrageous. They have to be more than just resisted – they have to be defeated ... The effort by black and white ideologues to repress the speech of others they find disagreeable or repugnant is also currently focused on Charles Murray."[79] Columnist Rory Leishman in London, Ontario, relates his argument to the attempts by the Ontario Human Rights Commission to silence Professor Philippe Rushton: "The Ontario Human Rights Commission is a mockery ... Academic freedom is essential to a democracy ... What is happening to our country? Who would have thought five years ago that university professors would soon be less free to express and debate their ideas in Ontario than in Russia?"[80]

Some commentators make it clear that they support the rights of inquiry and speech even though they have significant disagreement with Herrnstein and Murray. Even though he speaks of "a thesis unhelpful to race relations," William Safire asks "should such analysis be banned, its author condemned as a bigot?," answering "No; we follow inquiry wherever it leads."[81] Pat Shipman in *National Review*'s symposium says Herrnstein and Murray's "prognosis is one we must take seriously, whether or not we accept their interpretations of the

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IQ data."[82] The editorial that prefaces *The New Republic*'s symposium refers to the argument that "even to conceive of genetically influenced ethnic differences in I.Q. is racist" and says that "this is an intolerable orthodoxy ... To say that a debate simply cannot be had is to enforce a taboo utterly at odds with free inquiry."[83]

Others who argue in favor of discussion are listed in the footnote.[84] Randall Kennedy in *The New Republic*'s symposium is probably the most marginal of those opposing a taboo, basing his opinion on a view that sometimes is used to point to the futility of suppressing pornography: "Attempting to muzzle [Murray] will only give the book additional, bankable publicity."[85]

Specific Issues Discussed

This report will not be able to survey more than cursorily the many issues that are discussed in the commentaries, but it is helpful to give some indication of their content.

What is "science"?

As has been apparent from the denunciations, several authors contend that the research into intelligence, genetics and race is not truly science, but is "pseudo-science."[86] None of these are, however, in-depth discussions of the nature of scientific inquiry.

The nature of intelligence

Herrnstein and Murray include a detailed discussion of the competing theories of intelligence in the introduction to *The Bell Curve*. The debate concerning intelligence and intelligence testing is a major source of material for those condemning *The Bell Curve*, with attacks on the concept of "g" (for general intelligence),[87] arguments for multiple intelligence,[88] and other discussion questioning both the validity and utility of the data provided by IQ tests.[89]

Whether IQ tests are culturally biased

There is a long-established dispute as to the extent to which various IQ tests are "culture-free," as raised by many who condemn *The Bell Curve.* Thomas Sowell says that culture *does* count, and so finds no basis for objecting that intelligence tests are "culturally relative."[90] Columnists Josh Ozersky, James Strong and Linda J.

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Collier, however, raise the cultural relativity argument against the tests.[91] Brigitte Burger gives a specific spin to the cultural relativity point when she says that IQ tests don't really measure intelligence, but "rather, they measure what I have called 'modern consciousness,' a set of intellectual skills that are particularly relevant to operating in the highly specialized worlds of modern technology and rationalistically organized bureaucracies."[92]

The reliability of intelligence tests

Jacob Weisberg says that "no test can measure creativity or originality," and adds that "the most obvious argument against the validity of IQ is the fact that scores change."[93] Leon Kamin invokes an argument that is often raised in MArxist literature, where everyone's motives are suspect: that tests are manipulated to produce the results that the test-makers expect: "The Stanford-Binet revision of 1937, until fiddling, gave girls much higher I.Q.'s than boys."[94] Other commentators point to alleged abuses of testing during the first half of the twentieth century to indicate an unreliable foundation for the tests.[95] Others discussing IQ tests as such are listed in the footnote.[96]

The role of heredity in determining IQ

Columnist James Strong declares that genes play no part in determining intelligence, and Jacob Weisberg argues that "the case for a genetic basis of IQ is flimsy."[97] Brent Staples claims the connection is "long unproved," with "no plausible data."[98] The *New York Times* editorializes that the evidence is inconclusive.[99] Anthony Flint's article in the *Boston Globe* gives both sides of the heritability issue.[100]

Much of the discussion centers on the question of group differences in intelligence. Richard Nisbett says that "to invoke different patterns of abilities as evidence of a genetic basis for group differences is utterly unfounded."[101] Some accept the thesis that IQ is increasing through the generations, and see in that a reason to doubt genertically determined group differences.[102] Still more take up the issue of whether there are genetically determined racial differences in cognitive ability: Charles Krauthammer sees no basis for them; an unnamed author in the *San Antonio Register* asserts that

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most social scientists agree that environment, not genes, causes racial differences; Pat Shipman says that male-female studies suggest that differences are environmental; Andrew Hacker thinks Herrnstein and Murray biased for focusing on black-white differences when they aren't inquiring into such differences as may exist among sub-groups of whites (such as the Irish, Jews, etc.); and E. D. Hirsch, Jr., cites a lack of racial differences in situations where excellent education is available.[103]

Whether individual or group cognitive ability is subject to improvement through intervention

Daniel Seligman speaks of a growing belief among the literate public in limitations on the malleability of human beings, such as with respect to homosexuality where it is said that the preference is "immutable, not a personal choice," although he says that genes should be understood as creating "probabilities, not destiny."[104] Most of the authors in this survey who commented on the subject, though, argued *for* malleability (which bears directly on whether social interventions are beneficial).[105]

Role of factors other than intelligence in causing success

Many commentators take issue with Herrnstein and Murray's stress on intelligence, arguing that a number of other factors play important roles in whether an individual succeeds. In *Newsweek*, columnist Jerry Adler has a delightful piece which, by playing on the value of "good looks," makes the serious point that IQ is just one factor among others.[106] Patrick J. Buchanan points to character and courage; William Safire to motivation, stamina and family values; Michael Young to moral intelligence, virtue, mobility; Brigitte Berger to empathy, sense of humor, religious commitment; Don Munsch to ambition and diligence.[107] Other authors speaking to this issue are listed in the footnote.[108]

The "cognitive partitioning" thesis that society is becoming bifurcated by intelligence

Among those who look at the idea of "cognitive partitioning" in general terms are William F. Buckley, who expresses skepticism over what he likens to grand projections in the vein of Malthus and Marx;

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columnist Gil Spencer, who makes light of the Murray-Herrnstein thesis without any careful examination; and columnist Richard Grenier, who is not persuaded that anything apocalyptic is impending.[109]

As to the isolation of a cognitive elite, Patrick J. Buchanan opines that it will be neither exclusive nor dominant.[110] Michael Novak, on the other hand, believes *The Bell Curve*'s data "make a strong case" that a cognitive elite exists that is increasingly experiencing isolation and loss of realism.[111] B. A. Wilson thinks it is inconsistent to be concerned about the isolation of a cognitive elite, when the "old 'legacy' elite" was also isolated.[112]

As to the other end of the social scale, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., says that there is a partitioning between the black middle class and the black underclass, and takes a strongly environmentalist position by arguing that this is caused by cutbacks in federal programs rather than by genetic variations within the group.[113]

Whether low intelligence contributes to the rise of social pathology

Surprisingly, the causes of the social pathology to which Herrnstein and Murray devote several chapters receive relatively little attention in the early reactions, although James Q. Wilson in the *National Review* symposium discusses the causes of criminality.[114]

Whether there is a dysgenic trend

Thomas Sowell's article in *The American Spectator* gets into this issue most, referring to the theory that intelligence is actually increasing generation by generation and saying that "the implications of such rising patterns of mental test performance is devastating to the central hypothesis of those who have long expressed the same fear as Herrnstein and Murray, that the greater fertility of low-IQ groups would lower the national (and international) IQ over time." This is a rational argument that requires a response from those who support *The Bell Curve.* More than any other argument, the validity of the so-called Flynn-effect (the hypothesis that intelligence is rising rather than falling) challenges the entire Herrnstein/Murray thesis. [115]

What the policy implications should be

Little, if any, support is articulated for *The Bell Curve*'s

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recommendation for a conservative approach to the welfare state. Charles Krauthammer discusses it, but says that, preferring a color-blind society, he opposes any kind of multiculturalism, even a conservative one in which "each ethnicity finds its honored niche."[116]

Those who speak up on the policy implications are heavily in favor of continued social intervention to address problems in American society. Jacob Weisberg says that it can just as easily be inferred that interventions should be doubled as to conclude that they should be dropped; Nathan Glazer says American society cannot afford to adopt a purely meritocratic approach, and must consider group representation; Loren E. Lomasky in the *National Review* symposium says Murray's cost-benefit analysis in *Losing Ground* was better than the pessimism introduced by a consideration of IQ, and although Lomasky does argue for a meritocratic vision (using professional basketball as an example), he believes a realistic social policy can point toward raising the abilities of the less fortunate even if complete social parity is impossible; Dante Ramos argues that "clan pride" would worsen the black condition; Alan Wolfe says it is a mistake to focus on raising IQs, since a broader goal of raising "life's chances" is achievable; and Jason DeParle would expand rather than contract government efforts.[117] Others commenting on the policy implications are listed in the footnote.[118]

The perceived impact on "liberal myths"

It is evident to several commentators that the views expressed in *The Bell Curve*, if accepted, undercut the main premises of contemporary American "liberalism." David Brooks points to the views' incompatibility with "the holy troika of race, class and gender studies" that "assert discrimination and oppression."[119] Michael Barone in the *National Review* symposium welcomes the undercutting of the rationale for "victimization," which in turn serves as the justification for racial quotas.[120] Michael Novak sees that the destruction of these foundational beliefs can lead to a religious-type crisis within liberalism by destroying its adherents' hopes.[121]

Perception of weaknesses and inconsistencies in The Bell Curve

Alan Ryan in the *New York Review of Books* believes that the psychometric research by Herrnstein and the social philosophy of

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Charles Murray are disconnected, arguing that the policy implications are not supported by the IQ analysis. He sees inconsistencies in arguing for the intractability of IQ and then complaining about the dumbing-down of bright children; in arguing that affirmative action causes an inferiority complex in poor students but not seeing a similar effect within the old "legacy" system (where not-so-bright young men from families of high social standing made it through the Ivy League schools); and in asserting that there is a dysgenic trend while citing evidence that IQ levels are rising.[122] Christopher Caldwell in *The American Spectator* is strongly favorable to Herrnstein and Murray, but says that their many efforts at "hedging and conciliating" are "nonsense."[123]

Miscellaneous matters of content

As may be expected from such a quantity of writing, there are some notable *non sequiturs*, straw-man fallacies, and extreme factual postulates, in addition to much fine thought. Perhaps the worst *non sequitur* is that quoted by Nina J. Easton in the *Los Angeles Times* from President Clinton's October 1994 press conference: "Clinton said: 'I disagree with the proposition that there are inherent racially biased differences in the capacity of the American people to reach their full potential ... It goes against our entire history and our whole tradition.'" This same *non sequitur* is expressed by former HUD secretary Jack Kemp, a Republican: "I don't like telling people that are poor or low-income that it's a perpetual condition ... I think that is offensive to the American dream that I was taught."[124] There is, of course, no relationship between whether a factual proposition *is* true (or false) and whether someone *wants* it to be true (or false).

Arguably the most extreme factual postulate put forth by any of the commentators is the suggestion by columnist Eugene Brown in the *Michigan Daily* (University of Michigan) that the ancient Egyptians, with their contributions in mathematics, philosophy and architecture, were black.[125] It is possible that here, too, the wish is father to a belief as to fact.

Editor's Note: The following notes not only indicate the source of each reference, but also constitute a bibliography of the commentaries upon which this article is based.

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